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1 Supplemental Appendix

This paper bears my name but could not have been possible without the efforts of many others. I particularly thank Carol Weissert, Robert Jackson, Quintin Beazer, James Battista, William Berry, Brad Gomez, Christopher Reenock, Holger Kern, Amanda Driscoll, Jason Gainous, Matthew Pietryka, Robert Carroll, and three anonymous reviewers for their feedback.

This work would not be possible without the tireless efforts of the Florida Commission on Ethics, who over the course of two years handled my requests for financial disclosure forms.

Finally, I want to thank the undergraduate research assistants who worked on this project: Ashleigh Singleton and Laura Forero for their assistance collecting biographical data, Catherine Chivers and Julieta Barbera for their assistance collecting committee assignment data, and Kate McMahon, Peter Kreutzer, Harrison Weeks, David Advent, Chandler LeFevere, Lauren Greenfield, Kahla Haber-Brown, Brandon Osowski, Christian Mairena, Jonathan Ryals, Alexander Claffey, and William Harris for additional data collection and coding.

1.1 Why Florida?

After a comprehensive search of all fifty US States and the Congressional ethics disclosure service, I concluded that Florida was the only state that would permit a precise test of my hypotheses. I obtained these data from the National Conference of State Legislatures website on financial disclosures, www.ncslorg/research/ethics/financial-disclosure-for-legislators-income.aspx or, where available, the legislature's website on financial disclosure forms. When these sources were unclear as to the disclosure requirements, I called the state agency in charge of ethics or disclosure processing. States fall into four broad categories of disclosure: *none*, *nominal*, *ordinal*, and *continuous*.

Five states (Idaho, Michigan, Montana, South Dakota, & Vermont) require no financial disclosure for state legislators. Indiana requires personal financial disclosure for seven statewide elected officials, but not for state legislators. Utah requires state employees to fill out a Declaration of Conflict of Interest but does not require disclosing income in dollar amounts. In total, seven states report no personal income disclosures.

Twenty-seven states (Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, West Virginia, & Wyoming) require nominal disclosure. The forms vary from state to state, but none require legislators to report either dollar values or dollar ranges of income. Forms require legislators to list the names and addresses of employers, and often require the legislator to describe their occupation. When speaking with an employee at the Colorado Secretary of State's Office, I was informed that some legislators submit their tax returns as an attachment to their disclosure, although this is rare.

The following table reports the thirteen states where at least some sources of income are reported in dollar-ranges. Sources of income may include stock dividends, rent from properties, salaries, gifts, wages, tips, and miscellaneous income. Ordinal forms require the legislator to report their income as a checkbox in a series of categories. For example, Virginia requires members of the General Assembly to report all business-related income sources and to choose between five dollar amounts for each source of income. These ranges are: \$1,000-\$10,000; \$10,001-\$50,000; \$50,001-\$100,000; \$100,001-\$250,000; and >\$250,000. Congress reports dollar ranges for members as well.

[Table 1 about here.]

There are some exceptions to the dollar-range requirements that vary by state. Louisiana requires legislators to report exact dollar amounts for all income from the State of Louisiana.

Virginia requires legislators to report exact dollar amounts for all individual income that exceeds $250,000. When speaking to an employee with Massachusetts' financial-disclosure division, I was informed that the state was planning to overhaul its categorization of income in the near future. Members of Congress may, in addition to listing their own income sources, may list any source of income reported by a spouse or dependent that exceeds $1,000,000.

Two states, Connecticut and South Carolina, require state employees to report income they receive from government services. These disclosures do not require state employees to disclose private-sector income. In Connecticut, legislators also fill out a Statement of Financial Interests that lists all sources of income and a description of that source, but not the dollar value of income from each of those sources. In South Carolina, legislators may report their private-sector incomes, but most only report their public salaries and reimbursements. I collected all income values for members of the South Carolina House of Representatives from 2007-2015, consisting of a sample of 698 legislator-year observations. Average income in the sample is $59,994.42 and median income was $31,992.5. South Carolinian legislators are paid $22,400 and can receive as much as $10,500 per annum in reimbursements for travel, lodging, and food expenses. Of these 698 observations, 187 reported only their state salary. Another 177 reported income less than $32,900, the maximum combined salary and reimbursement rate. Only 207 of the 698 report income greater than the average. Furthermore, those 207 legislator-years actually comprised only 48 unique legislators. South Carolinian legislators who prefer not to report their private-sector incomes may be doing so to disguise their true wealth.

Thus, Florida occupies a truly unique position among American legislatures in that it provides precise, comprehensive data upon which I can test these hypotheses.

2 Collecting Financial Disclosures and Biographical Data in Florida

Collecting such sensitive data was of paramount concern. Out of an abundance of caution, my dissertation adviser and I obtained IRB approval to gather financial disclosure forms and other publicly-available data on members of the Florida House of Representatives.

The IRB approval memorandum is displayed in Figure 1.

[Figure 1 about here.]

The Florida Commission on Ethics provided the financial disclosure forms in eleven "batches" of approximately 300 forms apiece. Excluding duplicate forms, I received approximately 3,200 financial disclosure reports from 1991-2011. A further 360 forms for 2012-2014 are available on the Commission on Ethics website. This process took approximately a year and a half; the 1995-2000 forms were only available via microfilm in their un-redacted state and required substantial investments of time to extract. My liaison at the Commission, Kerrie Stillman, and a team of researchers spent months painstakingly spooling through microfilm, printing disclosure forms, and triple-redacting forms to ensure that legislators' personal privacy was maintained.

Members of the Florida House of Representatives are elected to two-year terms; most legislators serve at least two terms. As a result, most legislators are represented by least four observations in the dataset. These data were provided by the Florida Commission on Ethics. Due to sporadic turnover by death, early retirement, progressive ambition, and involuntary resignation, some years have more than 120 members and subsequently more than 120 financial disclosure forms. Some legislators fill out amended disclosure forms, Form 6X. When there is a discrepancy between Form 6 and Form 6X, I use the most recent information provided.

Despite unprecedented access to legislative finances, there are some constraints on what I can analyze with these data. Of the 3,200 forms available, 333 forms provide only legislators'

aggregate-level incomes as reported on their annual tax returns. As such, a nonrandom sample has aggregated, rather than itemized, sources of income, and examining variations in the number of jobs, or incomes from the sale of houses or stock, cannot be measured among this nonrandom sample. Forms also include detailed information on legislators' liabilities and assets, as well as the lawmakers' valuation of their own net worth. Lawmakers' assets and liabilities are far "stickier" than annual income and a bivariate regression of Net Worth$_t$ on Net Worth$_{t-1}$ reports an adjusted R^2 of 0.94. Therefore, in this analysis I do not report lawmakers' assets and liabilities as a dependent variable. To address potential concerns that wealthier legislators are less interested in acquiring income, I estimated a model with a lagged, logged version of the net worth variable as a control in replications of the OLS models reported in Table 3. The inclusion of lagged net worth as a control variable has a positive effect on income, but does not substantially change the results reported in the paper.

Collection of biographical data involved a team of undergraduate students and me sifting through available historical information on members of the Florida House of Representatives. For legislators who served between 1998 and 2014, this information was more readily available through the legislature's website. This information is self-reported, meaning that some legislators provided little basic information such as education status, private-sector career, or even birth year. When data was unavailable through the legislature website, we went to Project VoteSmart, Ballotpedia, or used open Google searches of the legislator's name to find pertinent information. When two sources provided different information (for example, if VoteSmart said the legislator received a BA and Ballotpedia said the legislator did not go to college) we used a hierarchical reconciliation system wherein the legislative website trumped all other sites, followed by Project VoteSmart, followed by Ballotpedia. Legislators' assignment to committees was collected thanks to documents provided by the Florida Office of the Clerk of the House.

2.1 Additional Discussion of Independent and Control Variables

The summary statistics of independent variables used in the main analyses are reported below. Additional information on certain independent and control variable follows.

[Table 2 about here.]

Vote share for each legislator was gathered from the Klarner et al. (2011) dataset, a comprehensive list of all state legislative electoral outcomes from 1967-2010. I opted to use vote share over votes cast, because of wide variation in the turnout rates between state legislative races. Moreover, the main analysis does not rely on primary election data. Primary vote share ranges from 0.22 to 1.0, with a mean of 0.89. In the main analysis, primary vote share is omitted. Primary elections have smaller, more activist electorates, which makes them less predictable than general elections. Moreover, these elections often contain multiple candidates. In Florida, if no lawmaker obtains the majority of the vote in a primary, a run-off election is held; several incumbents have finished second in the primary, only to win in the run-off.

The three prestigious committees I use are the Appropriations, Finance & Tax, and Rules committees. The official names of the committees reported by the Florida House of Representatives website change over time, but their basic policy functions do not. Of the three, the Rules Committee has the weakest formal power; however, the Rules Committee is also a place for loyalists of the party leaders, and the informal power they wield as members of the party's agenda-setting elite is sizable.

The types of offices examined for my ambition variables are as follows. Higher offices include state senate, statewide office (including judicial offices such as circuit courts) or the U.S. Congress. Lower office consists of mayoralships, city or county commissions, or local judicial offices. To obtain these measures, I conducted Internet searches for reports that former House

members announced a run for office. Indicators included press releases, campaign websites, and election outcomes. My searches included, but were not limited to, the Florida House of Representatives website, Project VoteSmart's online database of state legislators, and Ballotpedia. When two sources provided contradictory evidence, the Florida House website took precedence over Project VoteSmart, which in turn took precedence over Ballotpedia, which took precedence over all other sources.

The range of the tenure variable is quite large. A handful of lawmakers in the 1990s were long-term members of the Florida House of Representatives. Before term limits were enacted, lawmakers could serve unlimited amounts of time. The lawmaker who served 38 years was first elected in 1956, according to the state website. I generated, but do not report in the main analysis, a dichotomous measure related to tenure that controls for Florida's term-limits law. I code 1 if the lawmaker is in her last term and 0 otherwise. Perhaps lawmakers may accumulate additional income in their final term once removed from electoral constraints. However, controlling for a lawmaker's last term does not substantively influence other coefficients. Moreover, the coefficient for a "Last Term" Variable is negative, indicating that in a legislator's last term, her income declines.

The necessity of a variable including both postgraduate degrees and those with legal careers are due to the proliferation of legal jobs that are not filled by lawyers. Thirty-three, or 7%, of the lawyers in the dataset never obtained any postgraduate degree.

3 Results

The following section reports non-truncated models, robustness checks, and sensitivity analyses. In the following table, I report the full ECM including all controls.

[Table 3 about here.]

3.1 Outliers, Term Limits, and Progressive Ambition

Outliers may pose a threat to the inferences presented in the paper; 64 legislators report standardized income in excess of $400,000, and 29 observations in the dataset report annual *increases* to their income of over $300,000. I re-estimated the three error-correction models shown in the paper, omitting all observations more than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean. In practice this only removes 24 observations. Moreover, the main findings from the paper are changed in magnitude but not direction. Removing these observations has no impact on any finding, neither in the OLS nor the ECM approaches.

My measure of tenure may disguise a nonlinear relationship between term limits in the state of Florida and the income of lawmakers. Specifically, legislators in their last term are unconstrained by elections and have strong incentives to shirk, which may include additional income acquisition. I re-estimated the OLS models in Table 3, including a control variable for a lawmaker's last term. Inclusion of a last-term variable does not substantively change any of findings reported in Table 3. Another model including last term as a control and excluding tenure as a control also has no substantive change to the findings.

Finally, there may be potential concerns that the progressive ambition proxy variables I use - wherein I measure if lawmakers in the data eventually run for higher or lower office - are post-treatment and thus poor proxies for ambition. I re-estimated the OLS models from Table 3, excluding those variables. Doing so does not change the substantive findings reported in Table 3.

3.2 Dichotomization of Electoral Safety

My analyses treat the relationship between electoral safety and income acquisition as linear. Yet it may be that there is a threshold above which lawmakers see themselves as "safe" and can pursue income, or below which lawmakers see themselves as "vulnerable." Dichotomized vote share variables are themselves problematic as lawmakers tend to run as though vulnerable even when relatively safe, and individual incumbents' perceptions of safety outweigh objective measures. In my attempt to resolve this problem, I created iterated dichotomous measures of electoral safety, that run from the minimum (any seat won more than the barest plurality within the dataset of 0.40 is considered "safe") to an uncontested seat (any seat where the incumbent wins 100% of the vote is considered "safe" and no others). I then run 60 regression models replicating the main analysis, one for each iteration of electoral safety where the dichotomized variable replaces the linear variable from the main analysis, and collect the coefficients, standard errors, and z statistics. The resulting coefficients range from -0.128 to 0.112, but for all iterations such that $Safe > 0.51, Safe > 0.52 ... Safe > 1.00$, the effect ranges from 0.055 to 0.098. The graph in Figure 1 reports z statistics for those 60 regressions, with a horizontal line indicating 1.96.

[Figure 2 about here.]

The graph indicates that when electoral safety is defined as a vote share of greater than approximately 0.55, lawmakers begin to engage in systematic income acquisition. Scholars convinced that electoral safety occurs after a lawmaker has reached a 60% threshold, or a 65% threshold, can be reassured that my finding is robust to those specifications.

3.3 Hyperbolic Inverse Sine Transformation

In the following tables, I report the results of a full model using an alternative transformation specification to an intercept-shifted, logged dependent variable called the hyperbolic inverse sine transformation. The results are reported below.

[Table 4 about here.]

[Table 5 about here.]

The results mirror those reported in the main analysis. Electoral safety is positively associated with income, finding further support for that hypothesis.

3.4 Additional Jobs and Salary/Wage Income

There are two ways in which individuals increase their salaried income: obtaining new sources of income, or increasing the amount of income from existing sources. The main analysis does not distinguish between these two forms of income, because a lawmaker's preference in obtaining income is idiosyncratic. If private-sector benefactors court lawmakers as potential employees, the legislator could still quit her old job and start a new one. The number of sources of income remains the same, but the amount of income increases. Conversely, a lawmaker may accept a second job from a benefactor, and cut back at their old job, keeping income constant while increasing the number of jobs. Statistical output showing evidence, or lack thereof, of one mechanism of income acquisition would mask the fact that some lawmakers chose to use a particular approach while others did not.

Additionally, I do not distinguish between kinds of income in these analyses, particularly between salaried income and non-salary income. Lawmakers who hold successful private-sector

businesses held them before coming to office, and their tenure as a public official cannot be divorced from their businesses. Consider a lawmaker heavily invested in real estate who may acquire additional rental properties. It may be that the lawmaker would have engaged in this behavior if not in office. It may be equally the case that the lawmaker obtained additional profits from existing rental properties due to "free advertising" she receives as a legislator - this extra income provided her with the capital needed to invest in additional properties. Even by distinguishing between salary/wage income and other types of income, we cannot separate the effect of holding office on financial returns to office.

3.5 Difference-in-Differences Matching: Information and Balance Statistics

In this paper I focus on committee assignment, rather than change in committee status. As a result, I remove all observations where legislators were removed from committees. Only a small number of lawmakers are removed from committees from year to year: 180 of 2,367 in the Rules Committee, 195 of 2,367 in the Finance & Tax Committee, and 222 of 2,367 in the Appropriations Committee. Doing so ought to remove the least effective members of each committee, or those who did not lobby sufficiently hard to merit retention, or those who sought other appointments. Regardless of the cause, the effect of committee assignment status on income ought to be weakest among those observations, and consequently this approach provides a more conservative analysis than were I to include them in the analysis. Were I to include these observations as "control" units (not treated as assigned to the committee), I would increase the likelihood of finding a relationship between assignment and changes in income.

In the paper, and the balance statistics reported below, I report matched samples that employ 1:1 matching with a caliper of 0.5 standard deviations. I also estimated effects of treatments on income with 1:3 matching, and with calipers of 0.75, 1, 1.5, and 2 standard deviations. These other techniques reported equivalent or slightly worse balance than the specifications I report in the paper.

Below, I estimate and report means and variances demonstrating balance between treated and control subgroups. I also report Q-Q plots demonstrating balance between treated and control subgroups of the matched datasets. Each dataset is balanced after matching on all observable covariates. Because of the idiosyncrasies of the committee assignment system in Florida's House of Representatives, many legislators assigned to the Rules, Finance & Tax, or Appropriations committees in Year_t are assigned to only one or two of the other six observed standing committees in Year_{t-1}. Thus, many t-statistics report no difference of means because the treated and control subsets contain the same number of legislators assigned to a given committee. In some cases, there is no variance in the covariate after matching due to the exclusion of one subgroup of the covariate. Furthermore, the small share of non-white and non-male legislators in the Florida House of Representatives results in an identical share of each demographic group in the treated and control subsets. I conclude that I have obtained balanced datasets for analysis.

To preserve space in the balance tables, I do not label the covariates used to obtain balance. Those covariates are: Vote Share_{t-1}, $\text{Appropriations Committee}_{t-1}$, $\text{Finance \& Tax Committee}_{t-1}$, $\text{Rules Committee}_{t-1}$, $\text{Agriculture Committee}_{t-1}$, $\text{Judiciary Committee}_{t-1}$, $\text{Education Committee}_{t-1}$, $\text{Health Committee}_{t-1}$, Leadership_{t-1}, Age_{t-1}, Tenure_{t-1}, $\text{Major Party Status}_{t-1}$, $\text{Post-Graduate Degree}_{t-1}$, Female_{t-1}, White_{t-1}, Black_{t-1}, Hispanic_{t-1}, Year_{t-1}. If in a given model a covariate is the treated unit, it is removed from the list of covariates but this covariate order is maintained. Committee Chair is used as a treatment indicator in one model, but is not used to obtain balance in other models.

[Table 6 about here.]

[Table 7 about here.]

[Table 8 about here.]

[Table 9 about here.]

[Table 10 about here.]

[Table 11 about here.]

[Table 12 about here.]

[Table 13 about here.]

[Figure 3 about here.]

[Figure 4 about here.]

[Figure 5 about here.]

3.6 Models Including Ethics Committee Assignment

The initial results indicated that assignment to the prestigious Rules Committee decreased legislative income, contrary to the expectations of my theory. A potential explanation of this behavior is that Rules Committee members are primed to avoid conflicts of interest due to often handling ethics responsibilities within the legislature. Exposed to ethics violators, they would be less likely to acquire income from private-sector benefactors or pass legislation that personally benefited them. To test this explanation, I was able to obtain a document from the Florida Clerk of the House that listed each ethics violator and each standing or select ethics oversight committee from the 1970s-present. These data listed the meeting times, the transgressions the committees investigated, and the alleged violator. From already-available sources, I coded legislators' assignment to myriad Ethics Committees from 1995-2014. I combined this information into two dichotomous variables: **Ethics Committee** and **Ethics Violator.** An observation was coded as a '1' for the Ethics Committee variable if the legislator sat on any committee, standing or select, that had ethics jurisdiction, in the given year. An observation was coded '1' for the Ethics Violator variable if the legislator was accused of an ethics violation or was undergoing an ethics hearing in the given year. 207 observations were coded as 1 for the Ethics Committee variable, and 9 for the Ethics Violator variable.

Additionally, legislators who are assigned to be chairs of committees hold higher value than other committee members, as discussed in the results. I use one variable for being chair of any of the three committees, rather than a separate variable for chairing each committee; there is no theoretical justification that chairing any committee will have a negative effect on income growth. I report models that include ethics committee assignment in the following table.

[Table 14 about here.]

3.7 Corporate Board Appointment

I was given access to the names of legislators (and the corporate boards they sat on) made available by BoardEx, a database of board members employed from 2000 to 2013.[1] Only 35 unique legislators were identified - most state legislators are not prestigious enough to obtain access to publicly-traded firms, and many state legislators in my dataset currently hold public office, limiting their ability to sit on these boards. Nevertheless, these 35 individuals still managed to sit on a total of 367 unique boards, averaging 11 boards per legislator. I estimated the effects of assignment to the Rules Committee - controlling for their income growth, assignment to other committees, leadership position assignment, changes in vote share, and majority-party status - on both the number of boards a legislator sat on as well as whether she sat on any boards at all. Those results are reported below.

[Table 15 about here.]

These results do not suggest that legislators who sit on any committee experience "delayed gratification" and receive more corporate boards - or sit on any boards - by sitting on more challenging legislative posts. A state legislator can hardly expect to be rewarded with a post-electoral, lucrative career on corporate boards - if they are to retire comfortably, they have to pursue wealth on their own.

4 Robustness Checks

4.1 Primary Vote Share and Electoral Safety

The following figure shows the vote share percentages for observations who had a contested primary or general election (votes from run-offs are not included in the data). Lawmakers who face little general election contestation may be vulnerable to a primary challenge, which ought to adjust their expectations over how much they can invest in other legislative goals. Moreover, lawmakers who anticipate, or are able to dissuade, credible primary challengers ought to be as immune to the threat of defeat as a lawmaker in a gerrymandered district. Ansolabehere et. al (2010) suggest that primary challenges do not induce polarization in Congress; primary challenges, unless they are credible (i.e., the challenger has the backing of party resources; see Gierzynski & Breaux 1991), should not force state legislators to change their behaviors.

[Figure 6 about here.]

The following table reports coefficients from models that include primary and general election vote share variables, as well as models that average both vote share measures together to generate an overall measure of electoral safety.

[Table 16 about here.]

The findings indicate that primary elections have an inconsistent effect on income growth. When not controlling for legislator- and year- fixed effects, primary elections act as general elections in constraining the income acquisition of vulnerable lawmakers while permitting it for safer legislators. Including fixed effects eliminates this relationship. The consistent effect linking general election outcomes to financial gain is robust to the addition of the primary election variable.

[1] http://corp.boardex.com.

There are two possible explanations: first, a very small proportion of observations in the dataset face primary challengers of any sort (851/2905); moreover, in the few cases where incumbents compete in a contested primary and do not have an outright majority, they are able to find a winning coalition in the run-off election. Thus primary elections do not "scare" incumbents. There is little variance in the primary election variable compared to the general election variable. The second explanation suggests that incumbents with primary challengers may run scared, but uncertainty over the size of the primary electorate relative to the general election electorate is too great for them to abandon their existing efforts to make money. The unpredictable nature of primary electorates versus general election electorates – whether there will even be a primary, for example – allows lawmakers to average over expected outcomes and presume a modal category of no primary.

4.2 Interact Electoral Safety and Access Hypotheses

It may be that there is an interactive effect between the two hypotheses; i.e., both conditions may be necessary for financial gains to occur. The table below reports the results of models that interact vote share with each Access Hypothesis variable.

[Table 17 about here.]

The results consistently indicate that there is no interactive effect. The positive coefficient for the vote share constituent term is statistically-significant in all models, but the interaction terms in each model are not. Lawmakers with access to agenda-setting power do not reap the returns to holding office, nor do they see gains as their vote share increases. By contrast, lawmakers in safe districts do not see additional gains as a result of obtaining any policymaking powers.

4.3 Legislator Ambition and Electoral Safety

Lawmakers in more vulnerable seats may seek higher office to avoid being in an electorally-insecure environment. The theoretical explanation might be that ambitious lawmakers in secure seats can afford to wait a term or two, and accumulate income on the side, while those in marginal seats expend more effort building a campaign brand, engaging salient constituencies, or avoiding financial conflicts of interest. Those latter legislators have reduced incomes as a result.

These data are not well-equipped to answer this question, largely as a factor of the strategic considerations of retirement or candidacy for higher office. Lawmakers may run for other office anticipating defeat in their current office, or due to seeing the current office as a stepping-stone for ambition. The type of ambition is also not clear-cut: a "higher" office such as U.S. House may be more competitive than a "lower" office, but becoming the Mayor of Miami or Tampa may hold more power and prestige than would a back-bencher in Congress or a State Senator. My measure of legislators' ambition is a proxy measure, only measuring those who announced a run for another public office. Legislators who do not act on their ambitions or take action to leave their vulnerable seats are not counted. Nor can I conduct any analysis of the hundred-odd lawmakers in the dataset who are currently members of the Florida House of Representatives. Finally, as ambition is measured as an unchanging character attribute in these data, I cannot use the fixed-effects, ECM, and difference-in-differences matching analysis techniques. My measure of ambition is time-invariant, which restricts my ability to make short-run inferences about changes in ambition.

However, I can interact vote share with legislative ambition in a model using OLS estimation. I consider three such interactions: the first interacts electoral safety with lawmakers who

run for any office, while the latter two only examine lawmakers who run for higher or lower offices, respectively. I re-estimate the full OLS model from Table 3 of the manuscript, interacting the ambition variable (both the higher and lower ambition variables) with vote share; those results are in the table below. Additionally, I subset my data into two datasets: ambitious and not ambitious. I conduct t-tests for each subset, wherein I compare differenced income among lawmakers who are in competitive (< 0.70 vote share) to non-competitive (> 0.70 vote share). Those results are reported below as well.

[Table 18 about here.]

[Table 19 about here.]

This interaction provides little clarity. There is no consistent evidence that lawmakers who are ambitious report larger amounts of income. For lawmakers who do not eventually run for future office, the OLS model indicates that their incomes increase by $6,030 for every ten percentage point increase in their vote share. Lawmakers who do run for office report a decrease in their incomes as vote share increases, but the interaction coefficient is not statistically significant. This suggests that ambitious lawmakers temper themselves regardless of electoral vulnerability, whilst lawmakers without future ambitions do not. Breaking the type of ambition down into those who announce runs for higher or lower office results in persisting confusion: those who run for *higher* office report *declines* in their incomes as vote share increases, whilst lawmakers who run for *lower* office report *income growth* as their vote share increases.

The t-tests provide no evidence for the notion that vulnerable lawmakers "run scared." In competitive districts, ambitious lawmakers report income declines while content lawmakers report income increases - yet these differences are not statistically-significant. In non-competitive districts, ambitious lawmakers report income gains while content lawmakers report income decreases, although these too are not statistically significant. Simply put, there is not consistent evidence that ambition – however imperfectly measured here – conditions the relationship between electoral safety and financial gain.

4.4 Redistricting Cycles And Their Influence on Electoral Uncertainty

Redistricting may upend the predictable nature of running for re-election; after redistricting, legislators may be unfamiliar with their new districts and have incentives to "run scared." There are many reasons to assume most state legislators will be unconcerned with redistricting: the majority party controls redistricting, so most majority party lawmakers will have little to fear. Lawmakers who fear an unsafe district may opt to retire, believing that the vulnerability of their party is untethered to their own interests. By contrast, redistricting may place lawmakers in a state of uncertainty regarding their futures, leading to a reduction in the amount of time available to acquire income. Ultimately, this question has an empirically-testable answer: does the effect of vote share on income differ in years immediately following redistricting?

I created a dichotomous variable for the four years following the two redistricting cycles in the Florida House (2001, 2002, 2011, and 2012) and interacted that variable with the vote share variable, and re-ran the two full OLS models in Table (3) of the main paper. The coefficients are reported in the table below.

[Table 20 about here.]

These coefficients report that in years not immediately following redistricting, lawmakers report higher incomes as their vote share increases. In post-redistricting years, vote share

is uncorrelated with income growth. These findings are consistent with the argument that uncertainty induces lawmakers to "run scared." Yet when lawmakers can predict their future electorates, there is an opportunity to make money.

4.5 Last-Term Influences on Patterns of Financial Gain

In the case of financial gain, we would expect that lawmakers in their last term would begin to exhibit shirking behavior. In particular, lawmakers in their last term would start to seek additional sources of income or prepare for the private sector by boosting their productivity at existing jobs. Perhaps a selection effect of term limits places lower-quality legislators in the stead of higher-quality legislators (see Caselli & Morelli 2004). The difficulty comes from assessing whether or not term limits influence last-term shirking, or if they influence selection of lower-quality, income-seeking lawmakers. Last-term lawmakers in particular might shirk if they anticipate electoral defeat or plan to retire, and the imposition of a term limits law is irrelevant to their idiosyncratic considerations.

To test this argument, I estimated two sets of models. The first subsets the data to pre- and post- 2000 observations. After the 1992 term limits decision and the 1996 GOP takeover of the House, there is sufficient turnover and duration of time to infer that new lawmakers would be impacted by any selection effects associated with term limits. I estimate two OLS models that replicate column 1 from Table 3 in the main dataset (I opted for the non-fixed effects approach due to the lower sample size in the pre-2000 set). What we can see is that before and after term limits, lawmakers acquire additional income in roughly the same manner. Lawmakers' electoral safety is positively associated with additional income, as is being a party leader. There is some evidence that committee chairs and members of the Rules committee report income declines.

The second dataset relies on a variable that measures a lawmaker's last term in office, regardless of the year. Doing so lets me compare lawmakers who are in their last term for any reason. I interact this last-term variable with each explanatory variable in the Electoral Safety and Access hypotheses. The results are presented in the tables below.

[Table 21 about here.]

[Table 22 about here.]

The effects of income acquisition may have increased on the margins after the imposition of term limits for members of the leadership, but not for lawmakers in safer districts or lawmakers who sat on committees. Moreover, none of the interactions between Electoral Safety hypothesis and Access hypothesis variables and each lawmaker's last term have a statistically-significant effect on income. This evidence is consistent with Feher & Titiunik's (2016) work on term limits in state legislatures; state lawmakers do not exhibit patterns of shirking - at least as it pertains to financial gains - in their final term.

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Figure 1: IRB Approval Memorandum for Collecting Financial Disclosure Forms

Office of the Vice President for Research
Human Subjects Committee
Tallahassee, Florida 32306-2742
(850) 644-8673 · FAX (850) 644-4392

APPROVAL MEMORANDUM

Date: 04/13/2015

To: Carol Weissert <cweissert@fsu.edu>

Address: 2230

Dept.: POLITICAL SCIENCE

From: Thomas L. Jacobson, Chair

Re: Use of Human Subjects in Research
Goals and Behaviors of the Florida Legislature

The application that you submitted to this office in regard to the use of human subjects in the proposal referenced above have been reviewed by the Secretary, the Chair, and two members of the Human Subjects Committee. Your project is determined to be Exempt per 45 CFR § 46.101(b)3 and has been approved by an expedited review process.

The Human Subjects Committee has not evaluated your proposal for scientific merit, except to weigh the risk to the human participants and the aspects of the proposal related to potential risk and benefit. This approval does not replace any departmental or other approvals, which may be required.

If you submitted a proposed consent form with your application, the approved stamped consent form is attached to this approval notice. Only the stamped version of the consent form may be used in recruiting research subjects.

If the project has not been completed by 04/11/2016 you must request a renewal of approval for continuation of the project. As a courtesy, a renewal notice will be sent to you prior to your expiration date; however, it is your responsibility as the Principal Investigator to timely request renewal of your approval from the Committee.

You are advised that any change in protocol for this project must be reviewed and approved by the Committee prior to implementation of the proposed change in the protocol. A protocol change/amendment form is required to be submitted for approval by the Committee. In addition, federal regulations require that the Principal Investigator promptly report, in writing any unanticipated problems or adverse events involving risks to research subjects or others.

By copy of this memorandum, the chairman of your department and/or your major professor is reminded that he/she is responsible for being informed concerning research projects involving human subjects in the department, and should review protocols as often as needed to insure that the project is being conducted in compliance with our institution and with DHHS regulations.

This institution has an Assurance on file with the Office for Human Research Protection. The Assurance Number is IRB00000446.

Cc: Charles Barrilleaux <cbarrilleaux@fsu.edu>, Chair
HSC No. 2015.15236

Figure 2: Significance Test of Dichotomized Electoral Safety Variables, Iterated from 0.40 to 1.00.



Figure 3: Q-Q Plots, Matched Datasets of Committee Assignment in the Florida House of Representatives, 1995-2014



Figure 4: Q-Q Plots, Matched Datasets of Leadership Posts in the Florida House of Representatives, 1995-2014





Figure 5: Q-Q Plots, Matched Datasets of Vote Share Increases in the Florida House of Representatives, 1995-2014



Figure 6: Histograms of Primary and General Election Vote Shares, Omitting Incumbents Who Did Not Face Opponents, Florida House of Representatives 1995-2014





Table 1: Financial Disclosures Data Availability by State

State Name	Number of Categories	Highest Category
Alabama	6	>$250,000
Alaska	9	>$1,000,000
Arkansas	2	>$12,500
California	4	>$1,000,000
Hawaii	11	>$1,000,000
Louisiana	4	>$100,000
Massachusetts	8	>$100,000
New Jersey	7	>$500,000
Ohio	6	>$100,000
Texas	4	>$25,000
Virginia	5	>$250,000
Washington	5	>$125,000
Wisconsin	2	>$50,000
US Congress	11	>$5,000,000

Table 2: Summary Statistics: Explanatory and Control Variables for Members of the Florida House of Representatives, 1995-2014

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum
Vote Share	0.448	0	1
Leadership	0.021	0	1
Majority Party	0.620	0	1
Rules Committee	0.194	0	1
Finance & Tax Committee	0.183	0	1
Appropriations Committee	0.231	0	1
Committee Chairs	0.0213	0	1
Agriculture Committee	0.080	0	1
Education Committee	0.099	0	1
Health Committee	0.103	0	1
Judiciary Committee	0.097	0	1
Announced, Higher Office	0.427	0	1
Announced, Lower Office	0.210	0	1
Age	48	23	79
Tenure	5.28	0	38
Post-Graduate Degree	0.506	0	1
Legal Career	0.272	0	1
Business/Management Career	0.309	0	1
Female	0.235	0	1
White	0.713	0	1
GSP	$643,868	$541,898	$796,051

Table 3: Error Correction Model: Predictors of Legislative Income Gains, 1995-2014

		Income	
	Full Model	Electoral Safety	Access Hypothesis
$\Delta\hat{Y}$	−1.685 ∗ ∗∗	-1.722***	−1.685 ∗ ∗∗
	(0.364)	(0.370)	(0.365)
Δ Votemarg	0.551 ∗ ∗∗	0.610***	
	(0.150)	(0.153)	
Votemarg_{t-1}	0.108	0.169	
	(0.105)	(0.102)	
Δ Leadership	0.131		0.204
	(0.160)		(0.154)
Leadership_{t-1}	0.341∗		0.327∗
	(0.160)		(0.159)
Δ Majority Party	−0.309 ∗ ∗∗		−0.316 ∗ ∗∗
	(0.053)		(0.051)
$\text{Majority Party}_{t-1}$	0.055		0.060
	(0.050)		(0.050)
Δ Rules Committee	−0.189 ∗ ∗		−0.193 ∗ ∗
	(0.069)		(0.071)
Rules_{t-1}	0.065		0.063
	(0.052)		(0.052)
Δ Finance & Tax Committee	−0.037		−0.040
	(0.054)		(0.052)
$\text{Finance \& Tax Committee}_{t-1}$	−0.105		−0.120
	(0.068)		(0.070)
Δ Appropriations Committee	0.012		0.019
	(0.035)		(0.034)
$\text{Appropriations Committee}_{t-1}$	0.062		0.070
	(0.061)		(0.060)
Δ Agriculture	−0.182∗	-0.188*	−0.151
	(0.082)	(0.088)	(0.082)
Agriculture_{t-1}	0.114	0.172	0.116
	(0.099)	(0.105)	(0.097)
Δ Education	−0.031	-0.027	−0.047
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.048)
Education_{t-1}	0.141∗	0.120*	0.141∗
	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.059)
Δ Health	0.218	0.253	0.216
	(0.142)	(0.148)	(0.146)
Health_{t-1}	−0.027	-0.072	−0.015
	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.104)
Δ Judiciary	−0.063	-0.055	−0.070
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.048)
Judiciary_{t-1}	0.120	0.106	0.126
	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.069)
Ran For Higher Office	0.120∗	0.126*	0.123∗
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.054)
Ran For Lower Office	−0.099	-0.098	−0.094
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Age	0.009 ∗ ∗∗	0.009***	0.010 ∗ ∗∗
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Tenure	−0.019 ∗ ∗∗	-0.013*	−0.020 ∗ ∗∗
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Post-Graduate Degree	0.232 ∗ ∗∗	0.225***	0.234 ∗ ∗∗
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Legal Career	0.146∗	0.148*	0.157∗
	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.066)
Business/Management Career	0.139 ∗ ∗	0.138**	0.152 ∗ ∗∗
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Female	−0.364 ∗ ∗∗	-0.360***	−0.371 ∗ ∗∗
	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.050)
White	0.220 ∗ ∗∗	0.230***	0.227 ∗ ∗∗
	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.045)
ΔGross State Product	0.000 ∗ ∗	0.000***	0.000 ∗ ∗∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
$\text{Gross State Product}_{t-1}$	0.000 ∗ ∗	0.000*	0.000 ∗ ∗
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	10.158 ∗ ∗∗	10.319***	10.213 ∗ ∗∗
	(0.232)	(0.217)	(0.244)
N	1210.000	1212.000	1210.000
Wald χ^2	420.82	360.69	406.55
R^2	0.474	0.467	0.473
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table 4: OLS Model, With Hyperbolic-Inverse Sine Transformation on Dependent Variable

	Dependent variable:
	Income ($USD 2001), Hyperbolic-Inverse Sine Transformation
Vote Share	0.280^{**}
	(0.125)
Party Leader	0.019
	(0.131)
Rules Committee	-0.128^{**}
	(0.053)
Finance & Tax Committee	-0.015
	(0.053)
Appropriations Committee	-0.003
	(0.046)
Majority Party Member	0.045
	(0.066)
Committee Chair	0.077
	(0.116)
Ethics Committee	0.064
	(0.071)
Agriculture Committee	-0.058
	(0.084)
Education Committee	-0.066
	(0.072)
Health Committee	0.004
	(0.068)
Judiciary Committee	0.022
	(0.072)
Age	0.076
	(0.057)
Tenure	-0.077^{*}
	(0.040)
Intercept	-11.761
	(30.667)
Fixed Effects	Y
Observations	2,092
Adjusted R^2	0.509
Residual Std. Error	0.681 (df = 1628)
F Statistic	5.677^{***} (df = 463; 1628)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: Error-Correction Model, With Hyperbolic-Inverse Sine Transformation on Dependent Variable

	Dependent variable:
	Income ($USD 2001), Hyperbolic-Inverse Sine Transformation
Vote Share$_{t-1}$	0.114
	(0.174)
Leadership$_{t-1}$	0.495*
	(0.216)
Majority Party$_{t-1}$	0.084
	(0.089)
Cmte Chair$_{t-1}$	0.498*
	(0.198)
Rules Cmte$_{t-1}$	-0.016
	(0.079)
Finance & Tax Cmte$_{t-1}$	-0.170
	(0.137)
Appropriations Cmte$_{t-1}$	0.140
	(0.095)
Agriculture Cmte$_{t-1}$	0.073
	(0.156)
Education Cmte$_{t-1}$	0.177
	(0.094)
Health Cmte $_{t-1}$	-0.048
	(0.202)
Judiciary Cmte$_{t-1}$	0.180
	(0.106)
Ran For Higher Office$_{t-1}$	0.199
	(0.109)
Ran For Lower Office$_{t-1}$	-0.108
	(0.123)
Tenure$_{t-1}$	-0.028***
	(0.008)
Age$_{t-1}$	0.016***
	(0.004)
Post-Graduate Degree$_{t-1}$	0.276*
	(0.107)
Legal Career$_{t-1}$	0.238
	(0.136)
Business Career$_{t-1}$	0.233**
	(0.087)
Female$_{t-1}$	-0.403***
	(0.088)
White$_{t-1}$	0.242**
	(0.088)
GDp ($USD 2001)$_{t-1}$	0.000
	(0.000)
ΔMajority Party	-0.319***
	(0.080)
ΔVote Share	0.678*
	(0.292)
ΔRules Cmte	-0.166
	(0.113)
ΔFinance & Tax Cmte	0.015
	(0.083)
ΔAppropriations Cmte	-0.043
	(0.059)
ΔLeadership	-0.068
	(0.217)
ΔCmte Chair	-0.220
	(0.165)
ΔAgriculture Cmte	-0.127
	(0.123)
Δ Cmte	-0.047
	(0.073)
ΔHealth Cmte	0.337
	(0.286)
ΔJudiciary Cmte	-0.067
	(0.076)
Intercept	10.275***
	(0.581)
Δ $\hat{Y}$	-0.667
	(0.422)
N	1210.000
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Balance Statistics, Model Where ΔVote Share >= 0

	Before Matching					*After Matching*				
	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value
1	0.192	0.184	0.155	0.150	0.751	0.145	0.145	0.124	0.124	1.000
2	0.260	0.250	0.192	0.188	0.727	0.200	0.200	0.160	0.160	1.000
3	0.171	0.199	0.142	0.160	0.263	0.118	0.118	0.104	0.104	1.000
4	0.059	0.066	0.055	0.062	0.626	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	1.000
5	0.097	0.060	0.088	0.057	0.022	0.061	0.061	0.057	0.057	1.000
6	0.073	0.102	0.068	0.092	0.120	0.045	0.045	0.043	0.043	1.000
7	0.094	0.105	0.085	0.095	0.564	0.061	0.061	0.057	0.057	1.000
8	0.024	0.018	0.024	0.018	0.497	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	1.000
9	48.538	50.485	116.913	120.686	0.005	48.721	48.456	101.656	100.184	0.045
10	5.155	5.133	16.490	10.816	0.920	4.439	4.489	6.913	6.647	0.277
11	0.652	0.681	0.227	0.218	0.343	0.794	0.794	0.164	0.164	1.000
12	0.541	0.533	0.249	0.250	0.796	0.512	0.512	0.250	0.250	1.000
13	0.238	0.271	0.181	0.198	0.234	0.188	0.188	0.153	0.153	1.000
14	0.702	0.732	0.210	0.197	0.287	0.782	0.782	0.171	0.171	1.000
15	0.171	0.127	0.142	0.111	0.045	0.100	0.100	0.090	0.090	1.000
16	0.118	0.130	0.104	0.113	0.598	0.100	0.112	0.090	0.100	0.045
17	2004.912	2006.617	28.825	26.835	0.000	2005.676	2006.266	25.213	24.175	0.072

Table 7: Balance Statistics, Model Where ΔVote Share >= 0.05

	Before Matching					*After Matching*				
	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value
1	0.173	0.200	0.143	0.160	0.229	0.148	0.148	0.126	0.126	1.000
2	0.238	0.268	0.182	0.197	0.221	0.207	0.207	0.164	0.164	1.000
3	0.156	0.191	0.132	0.155	0.105	0.117	0.117	0.103	0.103	1.000
4	0.061	0.060	0.057	0.057	0.959	0.034	0.034	0.033	0.033	1.000
5	0.114	0.073	0.101	0.067	0.017	0.090	0.090	0.082	0.082	1.000
6	0.095	0.073	0.086	0.067	0.175	0.052	0.052	0.049	0.049	1.000
7	0.084	0.105	0.077	0.094	0.220	0.062	0.062	0.058	0.058	1.000
8	0.023	0.022	0.023	0.022	0.909	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	1.000
9	48.091	49.596	126.859	112.954	0.018	48.500	48.230	110.650	112.128	0.022
10	4.718	5.401	14.503	15.163	0.002	4.307	4.322	8.868	8.744	0.740
11	0.726	0.621	0.199	0.236	0.000	0.776	0.776	0.174	0.174	1.000
12	0.526	0.547	0.250	0.248	0.478	0.521	0.521	0.250	0.250	1.000
13	0.234	0.254	0.179	0.190	0.418	0.176	0.176	0.145	0.145	1.000
14	0.819	0.645	0.149	0.229	0.000	0.817	0.817	0.149	0.149	1.000
15	0.091	0.200	0.083	0.160	0.000	0.097	0.097	0.087	0.087	1.000
16	0.076	0.148	0.070	0.126	0.000	0.069	0.083	0.064	0.076	0.045
17	2005.476	2005.280	27.503	29.654	0.523	2005.672	2005.760	23.627	25.068	0.805

Table 8: Balance Statistics, Model Where ΔVote Share >= 0.10

	Before Matching					*After Matching*				
	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value
1	0.176	0.196	0.145	0.157	0.398	0.148	0.148	0.126	0.126	1.000
2	0.235	0.267	0.180	0.196	0.228	0.196	0.196	0.158	0.158	1.000
3	0.165	0.183	0.138	0.150	0.433	0.132	0.132	0.115	0.115	1.000
4	0.062	0.060	0.058	0.056	0.890	0.036	0.036	0.035	0.035	1.000
5	0.109	0.079	0.097	0.073	0.104	0.076	0.076	0.070	0.070	1.000
6	0.093	0.076	0.085	0.070	0.311	0.052	0.052	0.049	0.049	1.000
7	0.085	0.102	0.078	0.092	0.331	0.068	0.068	0.063	0.063	1.000
8	0.023	0.022	0.023	0.022	0.910	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	1.000
9	48.401	49.316	122.780	116.570	0.171	48.780	48.537	121.716	123.229	0.044
10	4.788	5.304	15.774	14.628	0.031	4.356	4.332	9.437	9.239	0.614
11	0.742	0.624	0.192	0.235	0.000	0.772	0.772	0.176	0.176	1.000
12	0.519	0.548	0.250	0.248	0.350	0.528	0.528	0.249	0.249	1.000
13	0.214	0.260	0.169	0.193	0.075	0.164	0.164	0.137	0.137	1.000
14	0.804	0.669	0.158	0.222	0.000	0.816	0.816	0.150	0.150	1.000
15	0.101	0.184	0.091	0.151	0.000	0.100	0.100	0.090	0.090	1.000
16	0.083	0.138	0.076	0.119	0.002	0.072	0.076	0.067	0.070	0.564
17	2005.641	2005.228	26.754	29.727	0.197	2005.820	2006.275	22.476	25.477	0.240

Table 9: Balance Statistics, ΔLeadership Model

	Before Matching					*After Matching*				
	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value
1	0.799	0.791	0.040	0.039	0.836	0.799	0.799	0.039	0.039	0.996
2	0.120	0.179	0.110	0.147	0.386	0.120	0.120	0.106	0.106	1.000
3	0.440	0.184	0.257	0.150	0.019	0.440	0.440	0.246	0.246	1.000
4	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.058	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
5	0.040	0.089	0.040	0.081	0.238	0.040	0.040	0.038	0.038	1.000
6	0.000	0.083	0.000	0.076	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
7	0.040	0.099	0.040	0.089	0.162	0.040	0.040	0.038	0.038	1.000
8	0.360	0.255	0.240	0.190	0.298	0.360	0.360	0.230	0.230	1.000
9	47.040	49.077	81.790	119.098	0.277	47.040	47.000	78.518	105.680	0.970
10	6.800	5.107	18.083	14.952	0.060	6.800	6.240	17.360	11.222	0.088
11	0.680	0.658	0.227	0.225	0.822	0.680	0.680	0.218	0.218	1.000
12	0.640	0.538	0.240	0.249	0.312	0.640	0.640	0.230	0.230	1.000
13	0.160	0.248	0.140	0.187	0.258	0.160	0.160	0.134	0.134	1.000
14	0.760	0.708	0.190	0.207	0.557	0.760	0.760	0.182	0.182	1.000
15	0.120	0.161	0.110	0.135	0.547	0.120	0.120	0.106	0.106	1.000
16	0.120	0.121	0.110	0.107	0.987	0.120	0.120	0.106	0.106	1.000
17	2005.480	2005.353	24.510	29.024	0.900	2005.480	2005.000	23.530	29.760	0.708

Table 10: Balance Statistics,ΔCommittee Chair Model

	Before Matching					*After Matching*				
	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value
1	0.854	0.789	0.035	0.039	0.081	0.854	0.845	0.034	0.039	0.232
2	0.357	0.252	0.238	0.189	0.269	0.357	0.393	0.230	0.239	0.318
3	0.250	0.173	0.194	0.143	0.365	0.250	0.250	0.188	0.188	1.000
4	0.464	0.176	0.258	0.145	0.006	0.464	0.464	0.249	0.249	1.000
5	0.036	0.062	0.036	0.058	0.478	0.036	0.036	0.034	0.034	1.000
6	0.071	0.089	0.069	0.081	0.727	0.071	0.071	0.066	0.066	1.000
7	0.036	0.083	0.036	0.076	0.208	0.036	0.036	0.034	0.034	1.000
8	0.143	0.096	0.127	0.087	0.499	0.143	0.143	0.122	0.122	1.000
9	0.036	0.022	0.036	0.022	0.716	0.036	0.036	0.034	0.034	1.000
10	44.321	49.197	51.634	120.176	0.001	44.321	44.536	49.790	46.606	0.733
11	5.607	5.115	5.136	15.259	0.274	5.607	5.214	4.953	3.097	0.202
12	1.000	0.651	0.000	0.228	0.000	1.000	0.964	0.000	0.034	0.318
13	0.607	0.537	0.247	0.249	0.464	0.607	0.607	0.239	0.239	1.000
14	0.143	0.251	0.127	0.188	0.126	0.143	0.107	0.122	0.096	0.318
15	0.786	0.708	0.175	0.207	0.337	0.786	0.786	0.168	0.168	1.000
16	0.036	0.162	0.036	0.136	0.002	0.036	0.071	0.034	0.066	0.318
17	0.143	0.120	0.127	0.106	0.744	0.143	0.107	0.122	0.096	0.318

Table 11: Balance Statistics,ΔRules Committee Model

	Before Matching					*After Matching*				
	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value
1	0.809	0.787	0.038	0.040	0.207	0.802	0.797	0.040	0.042	0.266
2	0.227	0.256	0.177	0.191	0.457	0.176	0.176	0.145	0.145	1.000
3	0.189	0.177	0.155	0.146	0.728	0.118	0.118	0.104	0.104	1.000
4	0.076	0.059	0.071	0.056	0.488	0.035	0.035	0.034	0.034	1.000
5	0.098	0.085	0.089	0.078	0.627	0.059	0.059	0.055	0.055	1.000
6	0.091	0.080	0.083	0.074	0.693	0.047	0.047	0.045	0.045	1.000
7	0.121	0.092	0.107	0.083	0.324	0.082	0.082	0.076	0.076	1.000
8	0.030	0.021	0.030	0.020	0.534	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	1.000
9	46.568	49.464	99.667	121.129	0.002	45.859	46.141	94.380	96.945	0.172
10	5.212	5.041	17.802	14.206	0.658	4.376	4.271	7.811	7.362	0.237
11	0.727	0.654	0.200	0.227	0.079	0.741	0.741	0.192	0.192	1.000
12	0.561	0.535	0.248	0.249	0.579	0.553	0.553	0.247	0.247	1.000
13	0.242	0.250	0.185	0.188	0.854	0.176	0.176	0.145	0.145	1.000
14	0.795	0.698	0.164	0.211	0.011	0.776	0.776	0.174	0.174	1.000
15	0.091	0.169	0.083	0.141	0.005	0.094	0.094	0.085	0.085	1.000
16	0.106	0.122	0.096	0.107	0.589	0.118	0.118	0.104	0.104	1.000
17	2004.727	2005.508	25.742	28.803	0.099	2004.941	2005.576	22.032	26.691	0.265

Table 12: Balance Statistics,ΔFinance & Tax Committee Model

	Before Matching					*After Matching*				
	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value
1	0.797	0.791	0.043	0.039	0.794	0.780	0.781	0.044	0.043	0.570
2	0.217	0.257	0.172	0.191	0.385	0.218	0.218	0.171	0.171	1.000
3	0.130	0.196	0.115	0.157	0.083	0.073	0.073	0.067	0.067	1.000
4	0.043	0.063	0.042	0.059	0.388	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
5	0.098	0.088	0.089	0.080	0.756	0.036	0.036	0.035	0.035	1.000
6	0.087	0.080	0.080	0.073	0.809	0.036	0.036	0.035	0.035	1.000
7	0.130	0.090	0.115	0.082	0.275	0.055	0.055	0.052	0.052	1.000
8	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.021	0.990	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
9	47.565	49.476	86.336	122.511	0.065	48.291	48.642	87.152	93.515	0.172
10	4.304	5.282	6.610	16.036	0.001	3.873	4.097	2.802	2.445	0.042
11	0.641	0.658	0.233	0.225	0.748	0.636	0.636	0.231	0.231	1.000
12	0.554	0.540	0.250	0.249	0.795	0.509	0.509	0.250	0.250	1.000
13	0.261	0.250	0.195	0.188	0.828	0.182	0.182	0.149	0.149	1.000
14	0.685	0.718	0.218	0.203	0.518	0.655	0.655	0.226	0.226	1.000
15	0.152	0.159	0.130	0.134	0.861	0.182	0.182	0.149	0.149	1.000
16	0.141	0.114	0.123	0.101	0.475	0.145	0.127	0.124	0.111	0.317
17	2005.652	2005.377	25.526	28.541	0.618	2007.109	2007.212	15.806	27.870	0.844

Table 13: Balance Statistics,ΔAppropriations Committee Model

	Before Matching					*After Matching*				
	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value	Mean(Tr)	Mean(Co)	Var(Tr)	Var(Co)	p-value
1	0.797	0.791	0.040	0.039	0.692	0.795	0.791	0.041	0.042	0.109
2	0.114	0.183	0.102	0.149	0.008	0.065	0.065	0.061	0.061	1.000
3	0.159	0.192	0.135	0.155	0.256	0.089	0.089	0.081	0.081	1.000
4	0.055	0.059	0.052	0.055	0.818	0.033	0.033	0.031	0.031	1.000
5	0.080	0.088	0.074	0.080	0.702	0.033	0.033	0.031	0.031	1.000
6	0.119	0.076	0.106	0.071	0.080	0.065	0.065	0.061	0.061	1.000
7	0.080	0.100	0.074	0.090	0.340	0.065	0.065	0.061	0.061	1.000
8	0.030	0.020	0.029	0.019	0.425	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
9	47.841	49.441	111.365	121.482	0.053	47.919	47.927	104.156	106.710	0.958
10	4.597	5.175	10.092	16.035	0.026	4.309	4.350	9.596	8.772	0.586
11	0.677	0.655	0.220	0.226	0.559	0.715	0.715	0.204	0.204	1.000
12	0.532	0.541	0.250	0.249	0.828	0.537	0.537	0.249	0.249	1.000
13	0.264	0.246	0.195	0.185	0.597	0.236	0.236	0.180	0.180	1.000
14	0.682	0.718	0.218	0.203	0.309	0.683	0.683	0.217	0.217	1.000
15	0.179	0.155	0.148	0.131	0.411	0.171	0.171	0.142	0.142	1.000
16	0.129	0.116	0.113	0.102	0.595	0.130	0.122	0.113	0.107	0.317
17	2005.318	2005.506	26.018	29.839	0.640	2005.569	2006.602	21.448	25.167	0.030

Table 14: Linear Regression: Determinants of Personal Income, Controlling for Ethics Committee

	Dependent variable:
	loginc
Vote Share	0.224^{*}
	(0.129)
Leadership	0.011
	(0.121)
Rules Committee	-0.085
	(0.052)
Finance & Tax Committee	-0.021
	(0.059)
Appropriations Committee	-0.018
	(0.037)
Majority Party	0.022
	(0.042)
Committee Chair	0.053
	(0.107)
Ethics Committee	0.010
	(0.054)
Agriculture Committee	-0.031
	(0.055)
Education Committee	-0.011
	(0.048)
Health Committee	0.009
	(0.053)
Judiciary Committee	0.038
	(0.041)
Ran For Higher Office	6.882^{***}
	(0.228)
Ran For Lower Office	18.988^{***}
	(0.606)
Age	-0.269^{***}
	(0.007)
Tenure	0.277^{***}
	(0.010)
Post-Graduate Degree	10.222^{***}
	(0.350)
Legal Career	-4.529^{***}
	(0.229)
Business/Management Career	6.888^{***}
	(0.239)
Female	-6.952^{***}
	(0.204)
White	10.012^{***}
	(0.318)
Gross State Product	0.00004^{*}
	(0.00002)
Year & Legislator Fixed Effects	Yes
Intercept	-22.330
	(14.398)
Observations	1,580
R^2	0.738
Adjusted R^2	0.668
Residual Std. Error	0.404 (df = 1248)
F Statistic	10.605^{***} (df = 331; 1248)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: Predictors of Corporate Board Seats: Negative Binomial and Logistic Regression Models, 1995-2014

	Dependent variable:	
	# Board Seats	Dichotomous Board Seat
	Negative Binomial	*Logistic Regression*
ΔRules Committee	0.171	0.160
	(0.137)	(0.136)
ΔIncome (in $100,000s)	0.007	−0.005
	(0.022)	(0.021)
Majority Party	−0.011	−0.107
	(0.416)	(0.413)
ΔVote Share	0.214	−0.012
	(0.383)	(0.398)
ΔLeadership Position	0.227	0.202
	(0.567)	(0.640)
ΔFinance & Tax Committee	−0.004	0.157
	(0.199)	(0.178)
ΔAppropriations Committee	0.073	0.041
	(0.096)	(0.090)
Intercept	−0.175	−2.290***
	(0.314)	(0.333)
Observations	1,419	1,419
Log Likelihood	−3,367.763	−419.926
θ	21,769.100	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,751.526	855.853
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Note:	Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses.	

Table 16: OLS Models: Determinants of Income, Inclusion of Primary Electoral Safety, and Overall Electoral Safety, Florida House of Representatives 1995-2014

	Dependent variable:	
	Income (2001 $USD)	
	(1)	(2)
Vote Share (General)	0.214***	0.166**
	(0.074)	(0.074)
Vote Share (Primary)	0.185***	−0.026
	(0.065)	(0.067)
Party Leader	0.385***	−0.047
	(0.099)	(0.093)
Majority Party	0.064	0.004
	(0.050)	(0.024)
Committee Chair	0.250*	0.026
	(0.148)	(0.051)
Rules Committee	−0.034	−0.047
	(0.046)	(0.034)
Finance & Tax Committee	−0.050	−0.027
	(0.051)	(0.042)
Appropriations Committee	0.033	−0.011
	(0.033)	(0.025)
Constant	10.000***	11.200***
	(0.221)	(0.060)
Controls	Y	Y
Observations	1,581	2,279
Adjusted R^2	0.154	0.697
F Statistic	14.000***	11.800***
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Note:	Standard errors are clustered by year.	

Table 17: OLS Models: Interactions Between Electoral Safety and Access Hypothesis Variables, Florida House of Representatives 1995-2014

	Dependent variable:					
	Income (2001 $USD)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Vote Share	0.146**	0.172**	0.159**	0.112*	0.136***	0.207**
	(0.068)	(0.083)	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.040)	(0.094)
Party Leader	−0.716	−0.046	−0.046	−0.046	−0.049	−0.046
	(0.623)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.093)
Majority Party	0.001	0.013	0.002	−0.0003	0.002	0.001
	(0.024)	(0.123)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Committee Chair	0.026	0.028	−0.099	0.020	0.030	0.029
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.293)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Rules Committee	−0.048	−0.048	−0.049	−0.286	−0.049	−0.049
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.192)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Finance & Tax Committee	−0.029	−0.027	−0.026	−0.029	−0.158	−0.026
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.251)	(0.041)
Appropriations Committee	−0.011	−0.012	−0.012	−0.012	−0.013	0.141
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.137)
Vote Share x Party Leader	0.761					
	(0.683)					
Vote Share x Majority Party		−0.012				
		(0.140)				
Vote Share x Committee Chair			0.146			
			(0.348)			
Vote Share x Rules Committee				0.287		
				(0.208)		
Vote Share x Finance & Tax Cmte					0.163	
					(0.278)	
Vote Share x Appropriations Cmte						−0.183
						(0.148)
Intercept	11.200***	11.200***	11.200***	11.300***	11.300***	11.200***
	(0.044)	(0.094)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.092)	(0.087)
Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278	2,278
Adjusted R^2	0.698	0.697	0.697	0.698	0.698	0.698
F Statistic	12.000***	11.900***	11.900***	12.000***	11.900***	11.900***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Note: Standard errors are clustered by year.

Table 18: OLS Models: Interacting Electoral Safety with Ambition, Florida House of Representatives 1995-2014

	Dependent variable:		
	Income (2001 $USD)		
	(Ambition)	(Ambition, Higher Office)	(Ambition, Lower Office)
Vote Share	0.468**	0.482***	0.177*
	(0.186)	(0.089)	(0.107)
Ambition	0.301	0.587***	−0.396***
	(0.194)	(0.142)	(0.151)
Vote Share x Ambition	−0.292	−0.535***	0.312*
	(0.227)	(0.152)	(0.181)
Party Leaders	0.401***	0.394***	0.405***
	(0.099)	(0.103)	(0.097)
Majority Party	0.081*	0.074	0.071
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Committee Chairs	0.249*	0.263*	0.259*
	(0.145)	(0.149)	(0.152)
Rules Committee	−0.033	−0.032	−0.032
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Finance & Tax Committee	−0.050	−0.056	−0.043
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Appropriations Committee	0.041	0.043	0.032
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Intercept	9.970***	9.920***	10.300***
	(0.275)	(0.196)	(0.213)
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1,580	1,580	1,580
Adjusted R^2	0.143	0.156	0.148
F Statistic	13.500***	14.900***	14.100***
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 19: T-Tests: Differenced Income Values by subset of data into Ambitious and Content lawmakers, Florida House of Representatives 1995-2014

	Ambitious	Content
Competitive	-18222	9806
Non-Competitive	5200	-8925
P-Value	0.30	0.30
N	1587	928

Table 20: OLS Model, Predictors of Legislative Income Gains, Post-Redistricting Interaction, Florida House of Representatives 1995-2014

	Dependent variable:	
	Income (2001 $USD)	
	(1)	(2)
Vote Share	0.267***	0.179**
	(0.085)	(0.079)
Post-Redistricting	0.177	0.184*
	(0.123)	(0.097)
Vote Share x Post-Redistricting	−0.110	−0.096
	(0.133)	(0.100)
Leadership	0.397***	−0.045
	(0.097)	(0.093)
Majority Party	0.065	0.003
	(0.052)	(0.023)
Committee Chair	0.259*	0.028
	(0.148)	(0.050)
Rules Committee	−0.033	−0.047
	(0.045)	(0.033)
Finance & Tax Committee	−0.044	−0.028
	(0.051)	(0.042)
Appropriations Committee	0.038	−0.012
	(0.033)	(0.024)
Intercept	9.960***	11.200***
	(0.224)	(0.045)
Control Variables	Y	Y
Fixed Effects	N	Y
Observations	1,580	2,278
Adjusted R^2	0.153	0.697
F Statistic	13.400***	11.800***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 21: OLS: Predictors of Financial Gain in the Florida House of Representatives, 1995-2014, Pre- and Post- Term Limits Subsets of Data

	Dependent variable:	
	Income (2001 $USD)	
	(2000-2014)	(1995-1999)
Vote Share	0.214**	0.241*
	(0.092)	(0.142)
Party Leader	0.431***	0.353**
	(0.128)	(0.162)
Majority Party	0.096*	−0.048
	(0.053)	(0.090)
Committee Chair	0.153	0.611***
	(0.183)	(0.147)
Rules Committee	0.022	−0.102**
	(0.054)	(0.052)
Finance & Tax Committee	−0.110*	0.096
	(0.066)	(0.069)
Appropriations Committee	0.059	0.021
	(0.042)	(0.057)
Intercept	10.100***	9.610***
	(0.298)	(0.082)
Controls	Y	Y
Observations	1,154	426
Adjusted R^2	0.149	0.212
F Statistic	10.600***	6.450***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	
Note:	Standard errors clustered by year.	

Table 22: OLS: Predictors of Financial Gain in the Florida House of Representatives, 1995-2014, Interacting Last Term With Predictor Variables

	Dependent variable:						
	Income (2001 $USD)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Vote Share	0.142**	0.171**	0.175**	0.168**	0.166**	0.167**	0.166**
	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.068)
Last Term	−0.118	−0.053**	−0.010	−0.042*	−0.049**	−0.019	−0.031
	(0.077)	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.032)
Party Leader	−0.038	−0.200	−0.036	−0.037	−0.039	−0.045	−0.040
	(0.094)	(0.156)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.094)
Majority Party	−0.001	−0.001	0.015	−0.002	−0.0003	−0.003	−0.001
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Committee Chair	0.026	0.030	0.034	0.080	0.026	0.026	0.031
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Rules Committee	−0.045	−0.046	−0.045	−0.047	−0.052*	−0.043	−0.048
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Finance & Tax Committee	−0.028	−0.028	−0.030	−0.030	−0.028	0.017	−0.028
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.042)
Appropriations Committee	−0.008	−0.007	−0.007	−0.009	−0.008	−0.009	0.008
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Vote Share x Last Term	0.085						
	(0.081)						
Party Leader x Last Term		0.202					
		(0.186)					
Majority Party x Last Term			−0.056				
			(0.049)				
Committee Chair x Last Term				−0.095			
				(0.125)			
Rules Committee x Last Term					0.014		
					(0.066)		
Finance & Tax Committee x Last Term						−0.148	
						(0.116)	
Appropriations Committee x Last Term							−0.042
							(0.048)
Constant	11.200***	11.200***	11.200***	11.200***	11.200***	11.200***	11.200***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.062)	(0.043)
Observations	2,276	2,276	2,276	2,276	2,276	2,276	2,276
Adjusted R^2	0.698	0.698	0.698	0.698	0.698	0.699	0.698
F Statistic	11.900***	12.000***	11.900***	11.900***	11.900***	12.000***	11.900***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Note: All models have year and legislator fixed effects and standard errors clustered by year.