In-Group Biases and Evaluations of Bureaucratic Competence in the U.S. Senate

Kevin Fahey

February 9, 2017

Author: Kevin Fahey

Address: 556 Bellamy Building, 113 Collegiate Loop, Tallahassee, FL 32306

Email: kf12d my.fsu.edu

Phone: (740)–513-7866

Abstract

Objective: Legislators are incentivized to vet and evaluate agency chiefs to avoid undesirable agency activity. But how do legislators assess the performance of bureaucracies? And do intergroup biases influence legislative decision-making? Do elites "set aside" personal prejudices when conducting assessments of competence? Or does bias distort their ability to objectively evaluate agency chiefs' performance?
Methods: I test these competing theories with a unique dataset of U.S. Senators and Cabinet Members from 1994 to 1996. I use the National Performance Review to generate a novel measure of bureaucratic competence. I test the influence of competence and ascriptive traits on U.S. Senate voting behavior.
Results: I find that legislators are not biased against out-group department heads, but that competence drives Congressional evaluations. Specifically, competence increases the probability of favorably evaluating Cabinet members by between 14% and 30%.
Conclusion: This finding has positive implications for democratic governance as it shows that lawmakers can eschew personal prejudices to reach optimal policy outcomes.

Keywords: In-Group Bias, Competence, Legislators, Bureaucracy

Introduction

In 1993, Senator Jesse Helms admitted to whistling "Dixie" when sharing an elevator with newly-elected Senator Carol Moseley-Braun, only the second African-American elected senator since Reconstruction. This exchange occurred less than a month after Sen. Moseley-Braun defeated "an amendment by Helms to renew the United Daughters of the Confederacy's patent on the Confederate flag insignia (AP, 1993)." He would later lead an effort in the Senate block her nomination to be Ambassador to the United Nations (Martin 2008). Senator Helms' actions are indicative of racial or ethnic animosity, but are they typical or aberrant in the U.S. Senate? If lawmakers cannot divorce their personal biases from the needs of constituents, it spells trouble for representative democracy.

Either openly or subconsciously, people judge each other based on skin color, gender, and other superficial attributes (Greenwald et al 2009; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis 2002; Dovidio & Gaertner 1996). These biases may diminish through exposure to diverse social networks (Thomsen 2012; Durrheim & Dixon 2010; Pettigrew 1998; Amir 1969), or increase as perceptions of inter-group threats grow (Hjerm 2007; Tolbert & Grummel 2003; Blumer 1958). Politicians, once seated in office, must handle their own prejudices and biases (Carnes & Lupu 2014; Saujani 2002). Politicians may benefit from rewarding political elites within their in-group to reflect their prejudices. They might also benefit by judging elites on the basis of their performance (Krause, Lewis, & Douglas 2006; Kaufman 1956). In the case of the bureaucracy, politicians have an additional incentive to use performance-based metrics to ensure political control (McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast 1987; Wood & Waterman 1981). Do lawmakers evaluate bureaucrats on the basis of attributes, or on the basis of demonstrated competence?

I put these conflicting expectations to a critical test using a dataset of legislative evaluations of members of Bill Clinton's first Cabinet, 1994-1996. I use Senate agency directive votes as proxies of evaluative signals. If competence predicts elite evaluations, then perhaps elites are able to divorce their personal biases from their obligations to the public. Conversely, if politicians judge bureaucrats on the basis of race, gender, or religion, it presents a direct threat to meritocratic civil service and democratic governance.

I find that legislators rely on performance indicators and not superficial characteristics to evaluate heads of bureaucratic agencies. Measures of shared group traits have little to no impact on how lawmakers cast votes on agency-specific legislation or agency appropriations. I employ a novel measure of bureaucratic competence to show that competent political appointees are favorably evaluated by legislators. The result has important normative implications for scholars' understanding of legislative-bureaucratic relationships: legislators' personal prejudices do not influence their decision-making processes. In a contemporary political climate riven with polarizing identity politics, these results should sound an optimistic and encouraging note.

The paper develops as follows. I theorize how prejudices are used as an evaluative tool, but that in-group members are also interested in competence to assess performance. I apply those general conditions to the U.S. Senate and the federal Cabinet. I measure critical traits that comprise a set of salient in-group criteria: race, sex, and religious affiliation. I discuss the results, showing that legislators value the job performance of bureaucrats and not their in-group status. This implies that legislators set aside their own prejudices in favor of concerns for government accountability, efficiency, and competence. Finally, it sheds light on a more personalized, idiosyncratic aspect of principal-agent relationships that nevertheless drive public policy.

Intergroup Prejudice

Prejudice between groups is the culmination of the formation of a shared identity (Blumer 1958). People within privileged "in-groups" develop negative attitudes toward outsiders to maintain group cohesion and receive the benefits of being in the group (Kurzban & Leary 2001; Hogg & Terry 2000; Jost & Banaji 1994; Morton 1991; Fireman & Gamson 1977; Blumer 1958). Favorable attitudes toward other in-group members (Swann et al 2009; Struch & Schwartz 1989; Tajfel 1982), and unfavorable attitudes toward out-group members (Lodge & Taber 2013; Stephan & Stephan 1985; Tetlock & Levi 1982) comprise the source of most intergroup conflict (Brewer 1999).[1] Thus, group conflicts can result in overt displays of prejudice (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis 2002). In-group

members' prejudices are used to form opinions of out-group members in social settings and individual interactions (Reeder et al 2004; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Hilton & Hippel 1996; Linville, Fischer, & Salovey 1989; Tversky & Kahneman 1974). These heuristics are employed as a predictive tool for determining future behavior (Druckman 2012).

Elites are no different than citizens in holding and acting upon personal biases. How political elites handle inter-group bias may be due to two mechanisms; either mechanism will induce lawmakers to vote against out-group members. First, legislators themselves may have biases; discriminatory treatment may be a result of their own upbringing. Empirical work demonstrates that legislators discriminate against putative voters on the basis of race (Butler & Broockman 2010). Other research finds legislators' socioeconomic upbringing informs roll-call voting (Carnes 2012) and cosponsorship (Carnes & Lupu 2014). If not personally biased, elites may act as though they hold biases to win favor with prejudices constituents (Butler & Broockman 2011; Neubeck & Cazenave 2001).

The electoral risks of non-conformity are high. Constituents may see equitable treatment as undesirable and retaliate against tolerant in-group elites, or reward intolerant challengers for discriminatory political activities and rhetoric (Reeves 1997). Elites whose constituents are comprised of fellow in-group members will discriminate to avoid retaliation. George Wallace's attitudes toward segregation in the 1960s serve as a plausible example; while Wallace may not have been personally intolerant (Rowan 1991), he was acutely aware of the electoral benefits of perceived prejudice. In an interview with Carol Rowan (1991), Wallace said: "When I first ran for governor...I had to stand up for segregation or be defeated."

Competence

Bias may not influence lawmakers' attitudes due to the incentive structure associated with bureaucratic oversight. People may discriminate as an evaluative tool, but also have an interest in determining the value of latent attributes of out-group members (Druckman 2012). To ensure that the legislature has control over the bureaucracy, lawmakers often reward preferred behavior while sanctioning unwanted bureaucratic discretion (Huber &

Shipan 2002; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast 1987; McCubbins & Schwartz 1984; Wood & Waterman 1981). Therefore, out-group bureaucrats who perform competently are preferred over in-group bureaucrats (Krause, Lewis, & Douglas 2006; Desforges et al 1991; Kaufman 1956). In return for good performance, bureaucrats are rewarded with more policymaking discretion (Huber & Shipan 2002), maximized budgets (Niskanen 1975), or other concession. This may even be the case when lawmakers hold strong in-group biases.[2]

Legislators have a vested interest in the competence of appointed officials (McCubbins & Schwartz 1984). Competence contrasts with bias-driven heuristics in that, unlike superficial characteristics, evaluation of competence requires time to form an accurate assessment. Determining bureaucratic competence is a function of active monitoring and the absence of constituent complaints over the agency's delivery of public goods, both of which are costly. Thus legislators are interested in obtaining an accurate answer, so that they do not reach a different conclusion than their constituents.[3] Therefore, even the most biased lawmaker will recognize the value in a high-quality, well-performing agency chief, regardless of personal background or ascriptive characteristics.

Two Competing Theories

In-group legislators have incentives both to use their in-group traits as a evaluative heuristic, and to accurately evaluate bureaucrats. To what extent do legislators rely on their own biases when judging the competence of a bureaucrat? Either elites cannot put aside their biases to make accurate assessments, or they act in their constituents' best interests, eschew their personal biases, and gauge the effectiveness of bureaucrats on the merits. I propose two hypotheses that comprise a critical test of these competing theories.

Legislators may use ascriptive in-group traits as a heuristic to judge the relative merit of the agency chiefs they monitor; the outcome will be the same if driven by implicit biases or strategic electoral calculations. Legislators' attitudes toward in-group Cabinet members ought to be higher than their attitudes toward out-group Cabinet members. These attitudes will not be changed by demonstrated competence or ineptness.

I label this the Group Status Hypothesis. By examining both the direct effects and the marginal effects of an interaction between competence measures and in-group attributes, we derive the following expectations. As legislators and department heads become less alike, legislators will evaluate them less favorably. Additionally, legislators' perception of competence is tied to their group status: given equal competence exerted, in-group agency heads will be perceived as more competent by legislators.

Group Status Hypothesis: Increasing intergroup "distance" will result in worse legislative evaluations of bureaucratic performance. Moreover, the marginal effect of bureaucratic competence decreases as intergroup "distance" increases.

If legislators primarily value competence, evaluation will be conditional on the perceived performance of the agency head. If an agency chief of any group performs poorly at a task or skill of great value to legislators, such as overseeing reforms to their agencies, she will be perceived poorly by legislators. If, however, she performs adequately or exceptionally at the same task or skill, legislators will evaluate her favorably. In-group or out-group membership takes a backseat to pressing policy concerns, or perhaps competence trumps out-group status even among otherwise prejudiced individuals.

Evaluation Hypothesis: As bureaucratic competence increases, legislative evaluations of bureaucratic performance will increase. Moreover, the marginal effect of bureaucratic competence is unchanged as intergroup "distance" increases.

I am interested in not just the individual coefficients but the marginal effects of an interaction between in-group biases and perceived competence. In particular, the marginal effect of competence across varying levels of legislative bias provides us with a critical test of the competing hypotheses. If group status is more important than competence, then competent in-group Cabinet members ought to be much more favorably judged than competent out-group Cabinet members.

Data

To test these hypotheses, I examine intergroup contact between members of Congress and leaders of the federal bureaucracy during the first Clinton administration. Clinton's initial Cabinet appointments increased the diversity of the US Cabinet, while the US Senate remained overwhelmingly white, male, and Protestant. Clinton pursued diversification to reward underprivileged constituencies, such as African-Americans, Latinos, and women, who had supported the Democratic Party in the 1992 elections. Yet the demographic composition of the Democratic-controlled Congress did not yet reflect this diversity.[4] Moreover, some legislators need the votes of biased voters to maintain their seats, and would act as though biased. Legislators accustomed to working alongside fellow white, male and Protestant colleagues may be biased - or act as though biased - against against Cabinet leaders who are female, nonwhite, and non-Protestant. Or, the composition of the Cabinet should have little to no effect on performance evaluations if competence matters more than superficial "group-status" traits.

During the first Clinton administration (1993-1997), Vice-President Al Gore led an initiative, the National Performance Review, to produce, and then track, recommendations to improve bureaucratic efficiency. I leverage these data to create a proxy measure of competence. This review of the federal bureaucracy coincides with public records of legislative votes for these same bureaucratic agencies. These data, along with data on the ascriptive characteristics of legislators and bureaucrats, allow me to test the extent to which group status influences competence evaluations.

The unit of analysis is each Senator's vote for an annual, agency-specific bill. I opt for Senators rather than all members of Congress for two important reasons. First, Senators are frequently in contact with Cabinet members during the nomination process. Forming initial impressions, and then subsequently updating those impressions, is central to the theory undergirding the Evaluation Hypothesis. Second, the smaller ratio of Senators to Cabinet members leads to a higher probability of closed-door interactions. Members of the House of Representatives are less likely to come into individual contact with Cabinet members. Examining only the Senate is a more conservative test of these theories - if

Senators do not use their in-group status or observed competence to evaluate Cabinet members, it is far less likely to occur in the House.

Dependent Variables

I employ two dependent variables that measure the outputs of legislative evaluations of bureaucrats. First, I collected every bill given a floor vote in the Senate, 1994-1996, and created a sample of floor votes that request or authorize a specific Cabinet agency to act; I call them "agency-specific directive bills." Second, I use votes on appropriations bills reported from appropriations subcommittees to the floor each year. Each measure has benefits that make them optimal for measuring legislative evaluations of bureaucrats. Agency-specific directives allow lawmakers to voice their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the specific activities of an agency, while appropriations votes represent a regular evaluation of each Cabinet agency.

I leverage a dependent variable that uses votes that require agency-specific action, demonstrating when legislators try to constrain the discretion of bureaucrats.[5] As an illustrative example of such a bill, in 1994 Congress voted on a bill designed: "To stop the waste of taxpayer funds on activities by the Department of Agriculture to encourage its employees or officials to accept homosexuality as a legitimate or normal lifestyle." Another bill was designed: "To strike a provision prohibiting the Secretary of Agriculture from approving Food Stamp 'cash out' demonstration initiatives." A third intended: "To repeal the restriction on use of Department of Defense facilities for abortions." Such bills indicate legislative dissatisfaction with actions of the Cabinet and a desire to rectify them. The full sample comprises each Senator's vote on 63 such bills across 10 Cabinet departments, 1994-1996, resulting in 6,138 observations.[6] This measure provides a precise vote - an evaluation - by each Senator of a Cabinet agency. A negative relationship between competence or in-group status and this measure is equivalent to a positive relationship when the dependent variable is appropriations votes - if fewer lawmakers vote to constrain agency behavior, they exhibit a positive evaluation of the agent leaders to act in ways consistent with Congress' preferences.[7]

Appropriations votes have a prominent position in the literature on relations between the legislative and executive branches; Kiewet & McCubbins (1985) argue that the appropriations process allow Congress and the President to shape public policy. McNollgast (1987) theorize that appropriations bills "provide a means for either general or programmatically targeted rewards and punishments (McNollgast 1987, p. 248; see also Kirst 1969)." If bureaucrats are utility maximizers (Niskanen 1975), the appropriations process is the forum through which they lobby members of Congress to increase their discretionary budgets. Moreover, members of Congress cast regular, annual votes on appropriations bills (Crespin & Rohde 2010). When legislators appropriate funds to bureaucratic agencies, they take into consideration the leaders of those bureaucracies due to their frequent interactions. Cabinet members lobby Congress for maximized budgets and are seen as the public face of their department.[8] Appropriations votes should strongly correlate with changing attitudes legislators hold toward political appointees, representing an unambiguous signal of support or rejection for agency management. Finally, since appropriations bills must eventually pass, legislators have an opportunity to register sincerely-held preferences. The full dataset consists of 4,200 observations: 100 Senators per Cabinet member (14 per year) from 1994-1996.

The limitation of using appropriations votes is due to the byzantine structure of the federal appropriations process. Only six of the fourteen Cabinet agencies (Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Interior, Transportation, & Treasury) had one Senate committee that oversaw the agency from 1994-1996. For the other eight, the appropriations subcomittees are set up such that Commerce, the Judiciary, and State are all funded by the same bill, Veterans' Affairs and HUD are funded by the same bill, and Education, Labor, and HHS are funded by the same bill. Thus, the main data-set counts the same vote for different Cabinet agencies. As the alternative is to select on the dependent variable by removing eight Cabinet departments, inclusion of all fourteen agencies and incorporating fixed-effects is the best approach.

Agency-specific directives are an ideal measure for testing both in-group biases and perceptions of bureaucratic competence. Appropriations votes are the primary publicly-

accessible and conceptually valid proxy of legislative evaluations of bureaucrats. Thus I measure two ways in which lawmakers' biases and preferences for competence will reveal themselves to the public. If, for either hypothesis, the resulting coefficients and marginal effects are positive (for appropriations votes) and negative (for agency-specific votes), it indicates consistent support for that hypothesis. Table 1 reports summary statistics for both dependent variables. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.

[Table 1 about here.]

Independent Variables

I measure the biases employed by in-group legislators in their evaluations of bureaucrats with dichotomous variables indicating ascriptive traits.[9] Lawmakers who represent historically disadvantaged groups will represent an "in-group" of their own and, according to the Group Status Hypothesis, exhibit favoritism toward non-white, female, or non-Protestant agency heads. My measure approximates intergroup prejudice by necessity; legislators are unlikely to submit themselves to surveys measuring intergroup bias. I gathered detailed biographical data of the United States Cabinet in the first Clinton administration. I rely on the frequency of key ascriptive traits to measure the extent to which an individual is 'in-group' or 'out-group.' The variables defining group status were chosen to be easily identifiable, superficial characteristics that did not require time-intensive observation to obtain. For both Senators and Cabinet members, I collected data on their race (using Census categories), their gender, and their religion. These variables are consistent with studies on in-groups and out-groups as discussed in the theory.[10] I dichotomized race to white/nonwhite, gender to male/female, and religious affiliation to Protestant/non-Protestant and report the results in Table 2.[11]

[Table 2 about here.]

The first Clinton Cabinet is 16.9% less male than their contemporaries in the Senate, 42.6% less white, and 37.2% less Protestant. In the aggregated measure, only 17% of

the Cabinet had all three in-group traits of interest, whereas 58% of the Senators in the dataset had all three traits. This discrepancy is a disjuncture from previous US Cabinets, which only had token representation of women, minorities, and non-Protestant adherents. The US Senate had not yet begun to diversify in terms of these ascriptive characteristics. As out-group members occupy Cabinet posts, I expect in-group members in the Senate to treat them differently than fellow in-group members in the Cabinet.

I quantify prejudice with a measure of shared in-group traits between legislators and Cabinet member. If a legislator and an agency chief share all three group traits, the measure is recorded as a 3. If they share no common traits, the measure is recorded as a 0. Legislators who share more traits in common with Cabinet members will be more likely to vote yes for the relevant appropriations vote, according to the Group Status Hypothesis. I also report results where these traits are disaggregated.[12]

A good measure of evaluation requires an unbiased, objective measurement of bureaucratic competence provided at regular intervals to legislators. My definition of competence focuses on efficiency; policymakers writ large in both parties would prefer to provide government services to citizens at a lower cost. The resulting savings could go into new programs, or reducing taxes. Most measures of bureaucratic behavior are ill-suited for the task of measuring changes in bureaucratic efficiency. Measuring the number of scandals in an agency in a given year or the number of Congressional subpoenas of bureaucrats is subjective and underestimates incompetent behavior. Budget decreases for an agency with an out-group Cabinet member could show support for intergroup prejudice, but may be a function of changing priorities in government.

Instead, I use the National Performance Review (NPR). The NPR provides unbiased and objective information of bureaucratic competence to all legislators. Initiated in 1993 by Vice-President Al Gore, the NPR was the product of consultation within the administration and with Congress over how to modernize, streamline, and reshape the federal bureaucracy. The reports were thousands of pages long and published broadly as the administration sought to identify itself as a problem-solving government (Clinton 1993). Since the goal of the administration was to improve efficiency, the Cabinet members who

streamline their departments the most are the highest-performing among the Cabinet. While the NPR has many advantages as a measure of bureaucratic competence, it is constrained by political realities; the 1996 NPR was essentially a campaign pamphlet, and after the Clinton-Gore ticket won re-election, the NPR ceased measuring changes in bureaucratic efficiency. As a result this measure is only available for the first Clinton administration.

The first report, in September 1993, detailed 197 recommendations for the Cabinet, with an average of fourteen recommendations per department. Each recommendation was accompanied with a fiscal impact, either by increasing savings or revenues. The NPR published follow-up reports in October 1994 and October 1995 that summarized the progress made by each department or agency on each recommendation. Importantly, the administration mentioned when agencies had made no progress on recommendations. From the recommendations found in the 1993 report I tallied the spending/revenue changes as a proportion of the department's FY1993 budget and weighted those figures for each recommendation by the number of recommendations by department.[13] I then aggregated those values by department to form a measure of the impact the recommendations would have on the department. This has the effect of incorporating both the number of recommendations as well as the share of the department's budget being affected.

The 1994 and 1995 reports focus on the accomplishments of departments in enacting recommendations outlined in the 1993 report. I gave a recommendation a weighting of 1 if the recommendation was completely implemented. It was given a weight of 1/2 if the recommendation was partially implemented or in progress, either as pending legislation in Congress or was in the process of autonomous implementation within the agency or department. It was given a weight of 0 if the recommendation was not being implemented or if the report did not mention any progress. Each weight was multiplied by the size of the change in the agency budget and aggregated into a single, department-wide measure of competence for the bureaucrat for each year.[14] I standardized each year's report into z-scores, re-scaled to range from 0-1. The reports were released late in the year and are matched to the following year's legislative session.

Table 3 reports two sample recommendations from the National Performance Review, and how these recommendations were coded. The 1993 Budget column details how much the recommendation would change in the federal budget in $USD millions; a negative number means the measure would spend less or raise taxes, whereas a positive number would either lower taxes or spend more.

[Table 3 about here.]

I make the assumption that all members of the Senate read and interpret the NPR in the same manner, in that they evaluate bureaucracies on their ability to reduce spending, increase revenues, and make progress or implement the recommendations of the report. I believe this assumption is apt as the report was designed to make the federal government more efficient and run like a business, an idea with overwhelming bipartisan support in the 1990s.[15] I believe that the reports comprise an objective measure of competence and match the theoretical concept of signals of new information sent to the Senate.

Control Variables

Legislators' personal biases may be co-opted by party leaders and their own ideological slant. The literature on party effects in legislatures describes the constraints parties and ideology place on elected officials. These legislators are interested in achieving pork barrel or policy concessions for their constituents than closely monitoring the bureaucracy (McCubbins & Schwartz 1984). Partisan and ideological variables influence roll call voting (Cox & McCubbins 2005), bill initiation (Aldrich 1995), and rhetoric (Maltzman & Sigelman 1996). By this logic, legislative attitudes toward out-group members in the bureaucracy will be informed by partisan or ideological differences between them.

To measure partisan or ideological variables consistent with the Strategic Actor Hypothesis, I use party-ID and ideology measures for both Senators and Cabinet members. For Senators I generated a dichotomous variable for Democrats and each legislator's first-dimension DW-Nominate scores as a measure of ideology. Since all of Bill Clinton's first-term Cabinet members were Democrats, a measure of bureaucratic partisanship would

13

not vary and is not included. Several measures of bureaucratic ideology exist (Chen & Johnson 2015; Clinton et al 2012; Bertelli & Grose 2011; Clinton & Lewis 2008; Bertelli, Clinton, Lewis, & Nixon 2007); ultimately Chen & Johnson provide the only measure of agency ideology that is subset by presidential administration and usable for this study.[16]

To control for legislators' policy preferences, I include a dichotomous measure for the 103rd and 104th Congresses that accounts for which Cabinet-relevant committees each Senator sat on.[17] Lawmakers may vote against changes to an agency's budget rather than signal their evaluations agent's competence or in-group status - as a control, I include a lagged measure of the outlays of the Cabinet agency. Finally, in the models where appropriations votes are the evaluative tool, I include a lagged measure of each Senator's appropriations vote. I include this measure to ensure that legislators' decisions to cast a vote are not informed by their previous vote for any given bureaucrat.

Analysis

Since the dependent variables are dichotomous, all analyses are binary logistic regressions. Furthermore, since I do not have independent observations across year, Senator, or Cabinet member, any regular analysis will overestimate the number of independent observations. To both account for legislative, bureaucratic, and year fixed effects, and to report panel-corrected standard errors, I control for a panel time component (each $year_k$) and two within-panel components (each unique $Senator_i$ and each unique Cabinet $member_j$), such that:[18]

$$\hat{Y}_{ijk} = \beta_1 Competence_{ijk} + \beta_2 GroupStatus_{ijk} + \beta_3 Controls_{ijk}$$

Results

The results of an analysis where agency-specific votes are the dependent variable are reported in Table 4. I interpret these votes as an inverse evaluation: if a lawmaker would send a negative evaluation to a bureaucrat, it would be to vote for the bill. I include

bureaucrat, senator, and year fixed effects with panel-corrected standard errors (standard errors reported in parentheses).

[Table 4 about here.]

These results provide consistent support for the Evaluation Hypothesis; as a bureaucrat's perceived competence increases from its minimum to maximum observed values, the probability of a lawmaker voting "Yea" on an agency-specific directive decreases by between 0.142 and 0.305. These are substantially large effects, robust to multiple specifications as seen in Table 6. The implication is that competence deters Congress from intervening in agency matters, preferring instead to grant discretion. By contrast, agencies with relatively low levels of perceived competence result in more Senators voting to constrain agents' behavior.

There is little support for the Group Status Hypothesis. When both lawmaker and bureaucrat are both Protestant or both non-Protestant, the lawmaker is more likely to vote "Yea" for an agency-specific directive bill, even when the bureaucrat is competent. When lawmakers share the same race, the marginal effect of competence on legislative evaluations is greater. This indicates that lawmakers may perceive white Cabinet members to be more competent than non-white Cabinet members and judge their performance accordingly. Yet that finding is not borne out by other analyses.

Undoubtedly, growing polarization in the last decade and the re-opening of raw racial and gendered divides in the United States suggest that Americans still rely on their prejudices to make decisions. Yet the evidence conducted here, using the only available metric of bureaucratic competence in the late 20th Century, suggests that lawmakers cast aside any biased beliefs towards women and minority groups. The result is normatively heartening for supporters of deliberative national political discourse.

Appropriations Votes

The results of four models where appropriations votes are the dependent variable and with all aggregated in-group traits are reported in Table 5. Positive coefficients

indicate a higher probability of an average vote being a "yes" vote. Standard errors are in parentheses (two-tailed tests).

[Table 5 about here.]

Bureaucratic competence has a positive effect on a legislators' decision to cast a "yea" vote in all models. Inclusion, exclusion, or interaction with shared in-group traits do not mitigate or condition the positive relationship between bureaucratic competence and positive legislative evaluations of bureaucratic performance. This pattern provides strong support for the Evaluation Hypothesis. This indicates that Senators do take performance of Cabinet members into account when evaluating them through the annual appropriations process. First differences reveal that moving from the minimum to maximum observed competence values increases the probability of a "Yea" vote by an average of 0.210, using the observed-values approach (Hanmer & Ozan Kalkan 2013). Such a large effect is all the more striking given that even at the minimum observed value of competence, the probability of voting "Yea" is 0.63.

There is evidence that group status matters, but counterintuitively, the more in-group traits are shared between legislator and bureaucrat, the less likely the legislator is to vote for the bureaucrat. Moreover, the substantive effect is small, indicating that group status plays an inconsequential role in legislative decision-making. Moving from zero shared traits to all shared traits decreases the probability of a "Yea" vote by 0.0301. Only on a particularly close vote would the conditional effects of group status on competence sway the outcome of a vote.

The interaction between competence and group-status is not statistically significant, indicating that group status does not condition perceptions of bureaucratic competence. The marginal effect of competence on appropriations votes is represented by the equation $\frac{dy}{dx} = \beta_1 + \beta_3 X_{In-Group}$. Increasing values of the $X_{In-Group}$ variable indicate increasing trait congruence between legislators and agency heads. In the full model, the marginal effect of competence decreases slightly but remains statistically significant as the number of shared traits rise from 0 to 3. The averaged model reports similar results. The marginal effects of competence is represented graphically in Figure 1.

[Figure 1 about here.]

These results show that legislators evaluate bureaucrats on the basis of competence, not on the basis of shared "group" traits. As Cabinet departments accomplish more tasks set out by the National Performance Review, legislators were more likely to favorably evaluate the agency, proxied with appropriations votes. By contrast, the measure of shared group traits is highly sensitive to assumptions about how legislators perceive the appropriations process. As a consequence, I conclude that there is little evidence to suggest legislators rely on group status when evaluating bureaucratic agencies.

Disaggregated In-Group Traits

I report separate analyses for each ascriptive in-group trait, to determine if some measured group traits influenced competence evaluations. To create the trait variable values, I generated new variables where an observation was coded a 1 if both the legislator and the bureaucrat shared the same group status (either both were in-group or both were out-group), and a 0 if they did not share the trait. Traits where competence has a smaller effect or non-statistically significant effect are those traits that legislators may value over others. The estimates of those different models are produced in Table 6 (standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed tests).

[Table 6 about here.]

The disaggregated models show a consistent relationship between bureaucratic competence and legislative evaluations of bureaucratic performance, suggesting that legislators value competence regardless of the bureaucrat's in-group or out-group status. There is again little evidence to suggest that group status matters either; lawmakers do favorably evaluate members of the same sex in the non-interactive model. Interestingly, the marginal effect of sex as a shared group trait has a negative impact on legislative perceptions of bureaucratic competence, indicating that competence matters *more* when lawmakers and bureaucrats do not share the same trait. I report that marginal effect in Figure 2. Lawmakers less-favorably evaluate lawmakers of the same race, which runs

17

counter to the Group Status Hypothesis, nor does race condition legislators' perceptions of bureaucratic competence. Finally, religious status has no direct or conditional effect on legislators' evaluations.

[Figure 2 about here.]

These results corroborate the agency-directives findings. While neither dependent variable is an ideal measure of legislative evaluations of bureaucratic performance, it is important to note that these two proxy measures find strong, consistent support for the Evaluation Hypothesis makes it difficult to imagine an alternative, systematic reason why lawmakers would vote for the appropriations votes and against the agency directive bills of more-competent bureaucrats.

Discussion of Results

Every model in these analyses reports a statistically significant and positive correlation between bureaucratic competence and appropriations votes. Thus there is strong support for the Evaluation Hypothesis. If appropriations votes and votes on agency directives correlate with underlying attitudes legislators have for bureaucrats, then competence is associated with more favorable attitudes and incompetence with unfavorable attitudes. Competence is not conditional on in-group status; while competent bureaucrats are seen more favorably, competent in-group members are no more highly rewarded than competent out-group members.

Why is there little support for the Group Status Hypothesis? Perhaps it fails to predict intergroup prejudices among political elites because it does not allow in-group members to value other traits more than their in-group status; electoral concerns or policy preferences ought to trump personal prejudices. Perhaps the impressive substantial credentials of out-group bureaucrats signal to biased lawmakers that this individual is "different" and should not be stereotyped. Future research needs to address the value in-group members place on their group status, and investigate whether or not other traits are more important to in-group members than their group status. Without controlling

for those other evaluative traits, scholars may inaccurately find that contact resolves intergroup conflict when intergroup conflict was not salient. Although this study finds little evidence of group status mattering, valid claims of racism and sexism are still prevalent in contemporary political debate.

Conclusion

I pitted a theory of elite personal prejudice against a theory of competence to evaluate heads of bureaucratic agencies. The data indicate that legislators can set aside their biases to assess others relying on demonstrated competence. This paper contributes to the literature on legislative-bureaucratic interaction by highlighting the role of competence in elite decision-making. The National Performance Review provides a brief glimpse into what is otherwise an unobserved process of evaluating top-ranking administration officials. With these kinds of measures, we can ask questions about the complex nature of principal-agent relationships.

On the surface, these findings indicate that the personal biases of members of the U.S. Senate, who included erstwhile segregationists as Jesse Helms, Strom Thurmond, and Robert Byrd, have no direct nor conditional effect on the attitudes of influential political elites. One plausible explanation is that lawmakers are not prejudiced against racial minorities or women. Perhaps lawmakers, in the course of their work, become immune to the biases that continue to drive political mobilization in the United States. Additionally, in a growing era of diversity and tolerance, lawmakers may not require the votes of prejudiced individuals to win and hold office, preferring instead to focus on ascendant, diverse coalitions of voters.

That legislative institutions work to reward competence has positive normative implications for democratic governance. Competent government officials might expect their hard work to result in less obstruction and more cooperation from legislators. Conversely, if leaders of governing agencies act ineptly, legislators may not wait for citizens to call attention to the problem before acting. Despite pervasive feelings of broken politics and irreparable gridlock, this paper provides evidence that governing institutions work.

Notes

[1]These biases need not be conscious efforts at prejudice and may be the result of socialization by fellow in-group members (Devine 1989). Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv (2008) use an intergroup prisoner's dilemma experimental game to demonstrate in-group altruism and out-group aggression. In no small part, biases drive attitude formation and decision-making (Jost & Banaji 1994). I hold that group identities are comprised of the collectivization of individual identities. This assumes that group members do not wholly dissociate from a separate group identity, although the value that individual group members place on group biases and prejudices may vary broadly.

[2]Instead of thinking of bias-derived heuristics as innate or fixed, I maintain that prejudices are the only information during initial intergroup contact. These beliefs are updated in light of receiving new information about specific out-group members (Gerber & Green 1999, Bartels 2002, Bullock 2009). If the out-group member's behavior conforms to the in-group member's prejudices, the predictive power of the previous belief will be reinforced and the existing negative attitude will be strengthened (Bullock 2009). If behavior does not conform to stereotypes, then the prejudicial belief may over time be discounted or eschewed entirely as an evaluative tool.

[3]The recent VA services scandal reflects the concern that policymakers continue to listen to constituent dissatisfaction with government goods and services.

[4]It should be noted that in-group solidarity works both ways and I expect lawmakers representing historically disadvantaged groups to exhibit bias against white, male, or Protestant agency chiefs.

[5]These bills were obtained by searching through the Library of Congress' Senate floor votes archive and examining bill titles and abstracts for language that specifically directed a Cabinet agency, or the Secretary of a Cabinet agency, to perform some action.

[6]The four excluded departments are the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, & Interior. Senators who were absent for such votes are not included in these data.

[7]Admittedly, that these bills are even sponsored signals at least token dissatisfaction with Cabinet members and may bias the results. The counterfactual would be that agencies without any such votes were perceived as the most competently-managed. There are many reasons why the lack of such a bill might not indicate satisfaction with the agency, such as an omnibus bill containing provisions that constrain bureaucratic discretion or bills killed in committee. Therefore, this measure is preferable to another measure that might take omission of legislation into account.

[8]While Cabinet subordinates may also interact with legislators, I hold that Senators will not be immune to attribution bias and will ultimately hold agency leaders responsible for the activities of their departments.

[9]I deliberately restrict my conceptualization of intergroup biases to individual-to-individual judgments in the sense that the in-group member and out-group member are both individuals. Legislative intergroup biases could also manifest as antipathy toward government agencies and programs that have in-group Cabinet chiefs but primarily service out-group constituents, or as a strategic act designed to appeal to constituents with strong in-group biases.

[10]Socioeconomic status is an important source of intergroup contact, but since so few members of the Cabinet have ever come from working-class backgrounds, and the individuals in my dataset are overwhelmingly well-educated and wealthy, this measure would not vary substantially.

[11]Many members of the Cabinet from 1993-1996 did not publicly hold any religious beliefs; I coded these individuals as non-Protestant even if they attended Protestant services as children.

[12]An aspect of my theory presumes that lawmakers' constituents drive biased evaluations of bureaucrats. Unfortunately, there are no surveys such as the Annenberg Survey that obtain adequate samples for all 50 states and ask respondents questions about racial, gendered, and religious animosity. I have identified a suitable proxy measure of constituent biases in the statewide vote share for George Wallace's 1968 presidential election. See the Appendix for a brief discussion of this alternative measure.

[13]For all three reports I treat projected savings and projected revenue increases as identical; legislators in the 1990s were focused on deficit reduction and were less ideologically orthodox than today concerning whether deficit reduction was through spending cuts or revenue increases.

[14]Many recommendations lack any substantive change to the department's budget (identified as $100,000 USD or more), or could not be estimated. When this was the case I made the budgetary impact of the recommendation $1,000, or $0.01 million USD. To calculate an agency's overall score, each recommendation in the 1993 report would be calculated as a percentage of the agency's FY1993 budget and then summed across all agency recommendations. This models the proportion of the agency's budget that the Clinton administration felt could be implemented by the agency, with the Cabinet member

leading implementation. For the 1994 and 1995 reports, each recommendation's progress is weighted by the recommendation's FY1993 agency budget, such that in 1994 the DOD was coded as "no progress" for reducing the National Guard, whereas the Department of Agriculture was coded as "full progress." I standardized each year's aggregated agency score into z-scores.

[15]This type of rhetoric is liberally applied throughout the NPR reports. Each NPR annual summary begins with a discussion of the goal of the NPR: to become more efficient and increase savings.

[16]For example, Clinton et al (2012) rely on surveys conducted on bureaucrats during George W. Bush's second administration, while Clinton & Lewis scores (2008) are averaged from 1988-2005 and cannot be subset by year. If I used averaged, aggregated agency ideology scores from across the H.W. Bush, Clinton, and W. Bush administrations, I ignore substantial ideological movement that occurred during the first Clinton administration. Chen & Johnson's scores are appropriate to the time period I analyze. Scores provided by the Chen & Johnson dataset are used to calculate ideological distance such that the measure is: $Ideology = |Ideology_{Senator} - Ideology_{Agency}|$. I expect that as an individual moved further from the Cabinet member's ideology, they would be more likely to vote no on appropriations votes (Poole & Daniels 1985), although ideological voting is not ubiquitous (Crespin & Rohde 2012).

[17]There are ten committees in all: the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 1993, the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Senators received a 1 if they sat on that particular committee and a 0 if they did not.

[18]The R package **lme4** was created by Bates et al. (2014) for conducting analysis on mixed-effect models where observations are clustered longitudinally and cross-sectionally; I use this package in all analyses. Additionally, this modeling approach has the added benefit of controlling for all agency-specific variance such as agency size or structure. While aggregated scores of in-group and out-group traits may show legislators acting favorably toward in-group members, it may be that one trait drives the results while the rest lack any predictive power. In the following section, I use an aggregated measure of shared group traits and then disaggregate the data for each in-group trait and analyze those effects separately.

References

Aldrich, J. H. (1995). *Why parties? The origin and transformation of party politics in America* (Vol. 15). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Amir, Y. (1969). Contact hypothesis in ethnic relations. *Psychological bulletin*, 71(5), 319.

Associated Press. "Helms Sings a Song of 'Dixie,' Moseley-Braun looks away." *Los Angeles Times*, August 6, 1993. Accessed on June 29, 2015 at http://articles.latimes.com

Bartels, L. M. (2002). Beyond the running tally: Partisan bias in political perceptions. /textitPolitical Behavior, 24(2), 117-150.

Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. 2014. "Linear Mixed-effects models using Eigen and S4." Submitted to the *Journal of Statistical Software*.

Bertelli, A., Clinton, J. D., Lewis, D. E., & Nixon, D. C. (2007, May). "The Ideology of Federal Executives and Their Agencies." In *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*.

Bertelli, A. M., & Grose, C. R. (2011). "The lengthened shadow of another institution? Ideal point estimates for the Executive Branch and Congress." *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(4), 767-781.

Blumer, Herbert. (1958). "Race prejudice as a sense of group position." *The Pacific Sociological Review*, 1(1), 3-7.

Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love and outgroup hate?. *Journal of social issues*, 55(3), 429-444.

Bullock, J. G. (2009). Partisan bias and the Bayesian ideal in the study of public opinion. *The Journal of Politics*, 71(03), 1109-1124.

Butler, D. M., & Broockman, D. E. (2011). Do politicians racially discriminate against constituents? A field experiment on state legislators. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(3), 463-477.

Carnes, N. (2012). Does the numerical underrepresentation of the working class in Congress matter?. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 37(1), 5-34.

Carnes, N., & Lupu, N. (2014). Rethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America. *American Journal of Political Science*.

Clinton, J. D., Bertelli, A., Grose, C. R., Lewis, D. E., & Nixon, D. C. (2012). Separated powers in the United States: the ideology of agencies, presidents, and Congress. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(2), 341-354.

Clinton, J. D., & Lewis, D. E. (2008). "Expert opinion, agency characteristics, and agency preferences." *Political Analysis*, 16(1), 3-20.

Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (2005). *Setting the agenda: Responsible party government in the US House of Representatives*. Cambridge University Press.

Crespin, M. H., & Rohde, D. W. (2010). Dimensions, issues, and bills: Appropriations voting on the House floor. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(04), 976-989.

Desforges, D. M., Lord, C. G., Ramsey, S. L., Mason, J. A., Van Leeuwen, M. D., West, S. C., & Lepper, M. R. (1991). Effects of structured cooperative contact on changing negative attitudes toward stigmatized social groups. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 60(4), 531.

Devine, P. G. (1989). "Stereotypes and prejudice: their automatic and controlled components." *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 56(1), 5.

Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (1996). "Affirmative action, unintentional racial biases, and intergroup relations." *Journal of Social Issues*, 52(4), 51-75.

Druckman, J. N. (2012). The politics of motivation. *Critical Review*, 24(2), 199-216.

Durrheim, K., & Dixon, J. (2010). "Racial contact and change in South Africa." *Journal of Social issues*, 66(2), 273-288.

Fireman, B., & Gamson, W. A. (1977). Utilitarian logic in the resource mobilization perspective.

Gerber, A., & Green, D. (1999). Misperceptions about perceptual bias. *Annual review of political science*, 2(1), 189-210.

Greenwald, A. G., Smith, C. T., Sriram, N., BarAnan, Y., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). "Implicit race attitudes predicted vote in the 2008 US presidential election." *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 9(1), 241-253.

Halevy, N., Bornstein, G., & Sagiv, L. (2008). In-Group Love and Out-Group Hate as Motives for Individual Participation in Intergroup Conflict A New Game Paradigm. *Psychological Science*, 19(4), 405-411.

Hanmer, M. J., & Ozan Kalkan, K. (2013). Behind the curve: Clarifying the best approach to calculating predicted probabilities and marginal effects from limited dependent variable models. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1), 263-277.

Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. *Annual review of psychology*, 53(1), 575-604.

Hilton, J. L., & Von Hippel, W. (1996). Stereotypes. *Annual review of psychology*, 47(1), 237-271.

Hjerm, M. (2007). "Do numbers really count? Group threat theory revisited." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33(8), 1253-1275.

Hogg, M. A., & Terry, D. I. (2000). Social identity and self-categorization processes in organizational contexts. *Academy of management review*, 25(1), 121-140.

Huber, J. D., & Shipan, C. R. (2002). Deliberate discretion?: The institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy. Cambridge University Press.

Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in systemjustification and the production of false consciousness. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 33(1), 1-27.

Kaufman, H. (1956). Emerging conflicts in the doctrines of public administration. *American Political Science Review*, 50(04), 1057-1073.

Kiewiet, D. R., & McCubbins, M. D. (1985). "Appropriations decisions as a bilateral bargaining game between president and Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 181-201.

Kirst, Michael. 1969. *Government without Passing Laws*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Krause, G. A., Lewis, D. E., & Douglas, J. W. (2006). Political appointments, civil service systems, and bureaucratic competence: Organizational balancing and executive branch revenue forecasts in the American states. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(3), 770-787.

Kurzban, R., & Leary, M. R. (2001). Evolutionary origins of stigmatization: the functions of social exclusion. *Psychological bulletin*, 127(2), 187.

Linville, P. W., Fischer, G. W., & Salovey, P. (1989). Perceived distributions of the characteristics of in-group and out-group members: Empirical evidence and a computer simulation. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 57(2), 165.

Lodge, M., & Taber, C. S. (2013). *The rationalizing voter*. Cambridge University Press.

Maltzman, F., & Sigelman, L. (1996). The politics of talk: Unconstrained floor time in the US House of Representatives. *The Journal of Politics*, 58(03), 819-830.

Martin, Roland. CNN.com. 2008. "Commentary: Don't sanitize Helms' racist past." Web. Accessed at http://www.cnn.com/ on July 31, 2014.

McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T. (1984). Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms. *American Journal of Political Science*, 165-179.

McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1987)."Administrative procedures as instruments of political control." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, 3(2), 243-277.

Morton, R. B. (1991). Groups in rational turnout models. *American Journal of Political Science*, 758-776.

Neubeck, K. J., & Cazenave, N. A. (2001). *Welfare racism: Playing the race card against America's poor.* Psychology Press.

Niskanen, W. A. (1975). "Bureaucrats and politicians." *Journal of Law and Economics*, 617-643.

Petersen, R. E. 2012. *Representatives and Senators: Trends in Member Characteristics Since 1945.* Congressional Research Service. Web. Accessed July 28, 2014.

Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). "Intergroup contact theory." *Annual review of psychology*, 49(1), 65-85.

Poole, K. T., & Daniels, R. S. (1985). Ideology, party, and voting in the US Congress, 1959-1980. *The American Political Science Review*, 373-399.

Reeder, G. D., Vonk, R., Ronk, M. J., Ham, J., & Lawrence, M. (2004). Dispositional attribution: multiple inferences about motive-related traits. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 86(4), 530.

Reeves, K. (1997). *Voting Hopes or Fears?: White Voters, Black Candidates, and Racial Politics in America*, Chs 1,2,4, & 5. Oxford University Press.

Rowan, Carl T. (1991). "The Rehabilitation of George Wallace." *The Washington Post*, Accessed July 10, 2016 at www.washingtonpost.com.

Sanbonmatsu, K. (2002). "Gender stereotypes and vote choice." *American Journal of Political Science*, 20-34.

Saujani, R. M. (2002). "Implicit Association Test: A Measure of Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making." *Mich. J. Race & L.*, 8, 395.

Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (1985). Intergroup anxiety. *Journal of social issues*, 41(3), 157-175.

Struch, N., & Schwartz, S. H. (1989). Intergroup aggression: its predictors and distinctness from in-group bias. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 56(3), 364.

Swann Jr, W. B., Gmez, A., Seyle, D. C., Morales, J., & Huici, C. (2009). Identity fusion: the interplay of personal and social identities in extreme group behavior. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 96(5), 995.

Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. *Annual review of psychology*, 33(1), 1-39.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. *The social psychology of intergroup relations*, 33(47), 74.

Tetlock, P. E., & Levi, A. (1982). Attribution bias: On the inconclusiveness of the cognition-motivation debate. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 18(1), 68-88.

Tolbert, C. J., & Grummel, J. A. (2003). "Revisiting the racial threat hypothesis: White voter support for California's Proposition 209." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*, 183-202.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. *science*, 185(4157), 1124-1131.

Wood, B. D., & Waterman, R. W. (1991). "The dynamics of political control of the bureaucracy." *American Political Science Review*, 85(03), 801-828.

Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Competence, Full Model

Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Competence, Sex as Shared Group Trait

Table 1: Summary Statistics of Legislative Evaluation of Bureaucrats, 1994-1996

	% Vote Yea, Approp. Vote	% Vote Yea, Agency Directive	# Bills, Agency Directive
1994	0.876	0.671	22
	(0.330)	(0.470)	
1995	0.679	0.541	22
	(0.467)	(0.498)	
1996	0.826	0.650	19
	(0.379)	(0.477)	

Table 2: Shared Group Traits Between Legislators and Bureaucrats, 1994-1996

% Each Trait	Male	White	Protestant
Cabinet	78.57	53.57	28.57
Senate	95.50	96.00	65.73

Table 3: NPR Recommendations and Progress

Recommendation Name	1993 Budget	1994 Progress	1995 Progress
USDA 01: End the Wool & Mohair Subsidy	-923	1	1
DOD 11: Reduce National Guard & Reduce Costs	-900	0	0

Table 4: Predictors of Legislative Evaluations: Agency-Specific Directives, 1994-1996

	Dependent variable:			
	Vote, Agency Directive			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Competence	−0.106***	−0.103*	−0.131***	−0.217***
	(0.041)	(0.059)	(0.047)	(0.069)
Shared Group Traits	−0.007	−0.013		
	(0.034)	(0.034)		
Shared Trait - Sex			−0.051	0.011
			(0.097)	(0.101)
Shared Trait - Race			−0.067	−0.117
			(0.076)	(0.083)
Shared Trait - Religion			0.116**	0.128**
			(0.056)	(0.057)
Ideological Distance	0.086	0.115	0.102	0.068
	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.123)
Sat on Relevant Committee	0.067	0.066	0.081	0.084
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Democratic Senate	−0.569***	−0.559***	−0.565***	−0.535***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)
Democratic Senator	0.585***	0.562***	0.548***	0.521***
	(0.150)	(0.138)	(0.155)	(0.145)
Agency Outlays$_{t-1}$	−0.008**	−0.008**	−0.007**	−0.010**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Competence:Shared Group Traits		−0.006		
		(0.031)		
Competence:Shared Trait - Sex				0.081
				(0.101)
Competence:Shared Trait - Race				−0.190*
				(0.099)
Competence:Shared Trait - Religion				0.196***
				(0.060)
Constant	0.685***	0.697***	0.716***	0.705***
	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.159)	(0.160)
Observations	6,138	6,138	6,138	6,138
Log Likelihood	−3,964.275	−3,964.336	−3,953.463	−3,961.304
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,956.550	7,958.671	7,944.926	7,954.608
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	8,050.661	8,059.505	8,072.649	8,062.164

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: Predictors of Legislative Evaluations of Bureaucrats, 1994-1996

	Dependent variable:			
	Appropriations Vote			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Competence	0.182***		0.172***	0.316***
	(0.054)		(0.055)	(0.104)
Shared Group Traits		−0.112**	−0.096*	−0.104**
		(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Ideological Distance	−0.994***	−1.012***	−0.973***	−0.982***
	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.231)	(0.232)
Sat on Relevant Committee	−0.056	−0.048	−0.056	−0.049
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.114)
Democratic Senate	−2.083***	−2.089***	−2.063***	−2.072***
	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.129)
Democratic Senator	1.134*	0.817	0.968*	1.127*
	(0.591)	(0.596)	(0.583)	(0.605)
Appropriations Vote$_{t-1}$	1.671***	1.698***	1.662***	1.679***
	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Agency Outlays$_{t-1}$	−0.005	−0.010***	−0.005	−0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Competence:Shared Group Traits				−0.087
				(0.053)
Constant	1.541***	1.969***	1.765***	1.736***
	(0.330)	(0.343)	(0.342)	(0.344)
N	4,188	4,188	4,188	4,188
Log-Likelihood	−1,696.393	−1,699.977	−1,694.659	−1,693.196
AIC	3,420.787	3,427.954	3,419.319	3,418.392
BIC	3,509.546	3,516.714	3,514.419	3,519.832

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Predictors of Legislative Evaluations: Disaggregated In-Group Traits, 1994-1996

	Dependent variable:	
	Appropriations Vote	
	(1)	(2)
Competence	0.195***	0.396***
	(0.056)	(0.114)
Shared Trait - Sex	0.190*	0.156
	(0.105)	(0.109)
Shared Trait - Race	−0.275***	−0.240**
	(0.090)	(0.095)
Shared Trait - Religion	−0.132	−0.140
	(0.088)	(0.090)
Ideological Distance	−0.962***	−1.029***
	(0.232)	(0.233)
Sat on Relevant Committee	−0.044	−0.049
	(0.114)	(0.114)
Democratic Senate	−2.066***	−2.086***
	(0.130)	(0.130)
Democratic Senator	1.037*	0.817
	(0.587)	(0.582)
Appropriations Vote$_{t-1}$	1.679***	1.656***
	(0.113)	(0.113)
Agency Outlays$_{t-1}$	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Competence:Shared Trait - Sex		−0.384***
		(0.135)
Competence:Shared Trait - Race		0.050
		(0.126)
Competence:Shared Trait - Religion		0.060
		(0.102)
Constant	1.621***	1.718***
	(0.342)	(0.347)
N	4,188	4,188
Log Likelihood	−1,689.469	−1,684.011
AIC	3,412.939	3,408.022
BIC	3,520.718	3,534.822

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01