The Perks of Being a Lawmaker: Returns to Office as a Legislative Goal

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Abstract

A growing literature demonstrates that holding office is financially lucrative for politicians. Yet little is known about the types of sitting legislators who profit from their office. Relying on an original dataset of members of the Florida House of Representatives, I estimate the predictors of income growth among sitting legislators. I find that legislators whose vote share increases by 10 percentage points between elections see their incomes increase by $20,000. Moreover, legislators who obtain leadership posts see their incomes increase by $52,000. However, most agenda-setting legislators do not obtain additional income. These data indicate that the market assigns value to legislators who demonstrate electoral dominance.

In January of 2003, State Representative Marco Rubio (R-Miami) was appointed to the Florida House Appropriations Committee. At the time, Rubio reported $122,718 in income. By December 2004, Rubio's income increased to $298,825.41 by obtaining raises at his existing jobs and accepting job offers from two prestigious law firms. His work at these new firms included lobbying state and local governments (Hamburger & Sullivan 2015). In 2007, Rubio ascended to the Speakership of the Florida House, at which time his income increased by another $90,000 as his salary doubled at one law firm, Broad & Cassel, and he began teaching a part-time political science course at Florida International University, drawing a $69,000 salary.[1] Perhaps Rubio's productivity quadrupled between 2003 and 2008. Far more likely, his prestigious legislative career provided Rubio with new economic opportunities. How widespread is the phenomenon of legislators using office for financial gains?

A growing literature argues that legislators obtain financial returns while in office (Fedele & Naticchioni 2015; Geys & Mause 2013; Fisman, Schulz, & Vig 2012; Parker 1996) and after leaving office (Palmer & Schneer 2016; Querubin & Snyder 2011; Eggers & Hainmueller 2009; Diermeier, Keane, & Merlo 2005). Yet much of this literature assumes that holding office benefits all officeholders equally. I present an argument of conditional financial gain. Legislators with influence over the legislative agenda, and those with safe electoral districts, stand the best chance to use public office for financial gain. First-term lawmakers with no power in the chamber should not be highly-prized by the private sector. Nor should lawmakers from vulnerable seats, who must dedicate their energies to winning re-election.

To test my argument, I collect annual financial disclosure forms for 532 members of the Florida state legislature, the only U.S. legislature that requires its members to report precise income values, and create a dataset of annual changes in legislators' income for each year they hold office. Alongside lawmakers' financial disclosures, I build a rich quantitative history of each lawmaker's biographical, electoral, and institutional characteristics. Florida's data are the means by which I identify the conditional relationship between holding public office and financial gain. Precise annual data permits me to identify even miniscule changes in income, and Floridian lawmakers have strong incentives to pursue private-sector income. The conditions are ripe to find evidence of mass patterns of income accumulation.

Surprisingly, I find evidence that only a select few sitting legislators obtain financial gains. I estimate the predictors of lawmakers' annual income growth, finding that the value of holding office is contingent on holding a "safe seat," or obtaining a leadership position. Specifically, a legislator whose vote share increases sees her personal income rise by $18,500. I find evidence that legislators who hold leadership positions boosts her income by approximately $50,000. No other institutional variable - majority-party status, committee assignment, holding committee chairs - shows systematic evidence for financial gains. Most lawmakers do not financially gain from office, but a select few do profit.

Scholars should benefit from this approach by recalibrating notions of legislative "value." The literature on legislative effectiveness outlines the added value that some legislators provide to the policymaking process (Volden & Wiseman 2014; Battista & Richman 2011; Pablo i-Miquel & Snyder 2006; Frantzich 1979). Another voluminous literature starts from the assumption that legislators who represent their constituents and their interests provide tremendous representative value (Rigby & Wright 2013; Lax & Phillips 2012; Arceneaux 2001; Maestas 2000). My findings indicate that the market assigns legislators a value independent of their qualities in representative or effectiveness, and demonstrate little evidence that lawmakers use the machinations of the legislature to become wealthy. Only in certain circumstances, when legislators have achieved purposive goals, are they able to obtain financial gains.

I structure the paper as follows. First, I outline purposive legislative goals and their connection to financial gains. I hypothesize that sitting legislators who have "fulfilled" purposive goals have higher value. Then I describe my dataset of members of the Florida House of Representatives and estimate changes in income reporting estimates from error-correction models and differences-in-differences matching. Finally, I discuss the implications of the results for the literature on legislative financial gains.

How Legislative Goals Enable Financial Gain

The prioritization of legislative goals has long been debated. Richard Fenno (1973: p.1) introduces five legislative goals: re-election, producing good public policy, influence within the chamber, progressive ambition, and private gain. David Mayhew's *Electoral*

Connection emphasizes re-election as the primary goal of elected officials, claiming that "Re-election underlies everything else" (Mayhew 1974, p. 16), while Fenno reasserts the role of producing public policy and obtaining influential legislative positions in *Home Style* (Fenno 1978). The pursuit of re-election, passing policy, and prestige within the legislature are purposive goals (Sinclair 1983). Private gain, or financial gain, as a legislative goal has only received recent attention. Parker (1996) theorizes that Congress has replaced civic-minded lawmakers with legislators who prioritize material benefits (see also Caselli & Morelli 2004). Diermeier, Keane, & Merlo (2005) develop a model of legislative career options to quantify the returns to office of a career in Congress. Moreover, they posit that "re-election may be better understood as an (intermediate) objective to realize other goals, like monetary income (Diermeier, Keane, & Merlo 2005, p.347).[2] Carey (2007) theorizes that rank-and-file members face pressures from "competing principals," including employers, to deviate from party-line orthodoxy on votes. Indeed, many scholars find empirical evidence that lawmakers pursue private gains while holding public office (Fedele & Naticchioni 2013; Geys & Mause 2013; Gagliarducci, Nannicini, & Naticchioni 2010; Beniers et al 2007; Parker 1992; Couch, Atkinson, & Shughart II 1992).

Some researchers estimate the financial benefits of holding office with regression discontinuity designs that compare candidates who barely win office to those who barely lose. They find substantial asset growth of Indian parliamentarians (Fisman, Schulz, & Vig 2012), estate wealth of British parliamentarians in the 1950s and 1960s (Eggers & Hainmueller 2009), wealth of US Members of Congress during the Civil War (Querubin & Snyder 2013), and post-office corporate board seats (Palmer & Schneer 2015). This work, while finding that public office is more lucrative than remaining in the private sector, does little to explain varying income gains among sitting lawmakers.[3] Moreover, there may be specific contexts in which legislators are unable to make money off their office.[4] The conditional nature of legislative income acquisition remains unexplored.

This literature argues that sitting legislators can profit more from their office than they could by remaining in the private sector.[5] What remains unknown is which legislators obtain financial gains, and the mechanisms by which said gains occur. I examine the conditions under which some sitting legislators enrich themselves.[6] I outline those mechanisms in the following paragraph, and then discuss each in detail.

Some lawmakers become wealthier in office than remaining in the private sector as

a function of purposive goal success. Lawmakers who win election easily both free up time to pursue additional income opportunities. Public service elevates a legislator's profile, opening up opportunities for additional sources of income. Additionally, power and influence within the legislature make the lawmaker an attractive employee for private-sector firms. If lawmakers are to make money, it will be individuals in these positions.

Electoral Safety

Legislators in close races must invest resources and effort into holding office. They solicit donors, invest in campaign infrastructure, and visit their districts to contact voters.[7] These exertions take time that could be spent making money, and incumbents facing tough re-election races may prioritize re-election over private-sector income. They cannot search for new income opportunities, nor can they accept time-intensive employment if presented to them.

Legislators who achieve electoral safety free up time to obtain additional income, and demonstrate various qualities that are appealing to employers. With additional time, a lawmaker can spend more time at her current job, obtain a raise, or pick up additional opportunities. By demonstrating electoral safety, she demonstrates valuable administrative and communicative skillsets to employers. Electorally-safe lawmakers can pursue additional income without worrying that doing so harms future electoral prospects.

If a legislator does not expect a credible challenger to run against her in the general election, she can spend her time in pursuit of other legislative goals (Goodman, Gross and Boyd 1986; Erikson 1972). These legislators spend less time fundraising, campaigning in their districts, or creating print, radio, and television advertisements. Legislators in safer seats will have the time to work longer hours at their existing jobs, or take advantage of their public office to appeal for raises and find additional employment. Those accumulated additional economic opportunities ought to lead to income gains.

As an additional check on financial gain, legislators in close races face scrutiny and accountability from their opponents. Opposing candidates easily turn a legislator's personal activities into an attack on whether the incumbent prioritizes her own interests ahead of her constituents. Therefore, legislators in close races eschew additional income to avoid negative publicity. Monitoring and the threat of defeat can constrain even small amounts of income. From 2009 to 2013, State Rep. Erik Fresen (R-Miami) reported

$40,000 in income from a company he founded in 2005 but dissolved in 2009 (McGrory 2014). This activity drew scrutiny and condemnation from his opponent, causing his electoral fortunes to suffer: in 2010, Fresen's vote share was 69%, yet declined to 51% in 2012. In 2014, Fresen stopped reporting income from the company and his income declined by 18.2%. Fresen was acquitted of any wrongdoing, but the harm to his electoral safety forced him to stop drawing the paycheck from his former company.

Close electoral margins force incumbents to allocate scarce resources to their reelection office and result in monitoring. Lawmakers in safer seats may forego traditional campaign activities. As such, market forces will value safer legislators over vulnerable legislators. I propose the *Electoral Safety Hypothesis*:

A legislator will receive more financial gain as her electoral safety increases.

Access to Agenda-Setting Power

Legislators with influence over the legislative agenda draw the attention of private-sector benefactors who provide employment opportunities. Legislative power is unevenly distributed; some legislators dominate the agenda while others cannot move their bills out of committee, or to the floor for a vote (Frantzich 1979). The top-down agenda-setting process by which most legislatures operate reduces the number of legislators who can effectively engage in policymaking, by means of negative agenda power (Cox & McCubbins 1993; 2005) and by reducing alternatives to the status quo (Shepsle & Weingast 1981).

Specifically, legislators with agenda-setting powers draw attention from private-sector benefactors. Benefactors are employers looking for well-connected employees to expand client bases, obtain favorable contracts, or are interested in competent and qualified individuals with knowledge of the political process.[8] Lawmakers can leverage their agenda-setting power into employment with these benefactors; legislative prestige begets public exposure to a wider variety of jobs than they would have obtained without agenda-setting power.[9] Extant literature already indicates that benefactors provide lawmakers with lucrative post-office employment (Palmer & Schneer 2016; Eggers & Hainmueller 2009); these opportunities surely exist for sitting legislators as well. Obtaining influence over the agenda signals to employers that a lawmaker possesses additional qualities that her colleagues do not. Employers looking to hire competent politicians can use influence over

the agenda as a heuristic to identify short-list candidates. This will hold whether holding prestigious positions and working to pass policy improves a lawmaker's value, or if a high-value lawmaker is more likely to occupy prestigious positions in the legislature.

Finally, lawmakers may use office to allocate public-sector resources to economic sectors where they have a private interest. For example, a legislator from an agricultural district (who also happens to own a farm) may propose a new project that provides a financial windfall to farmers in her district, including herself. Her farm's income will increase directly from her legislation. Couch, Atkinson, & Shughart (1992) found that Alabama lawmakers employed by higher education institutions appropriated more to education as salaries from their institutions increased. Szakonyi (2015) uses a regression-discontinuity design of Russian lawmakers to find that firms associated with winning candidates report significant profits.[10] Business owners who hold public office and report corporate profits will see their personal incomes rise accordingly.

For example, in 2011, State Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-Ft. Walton Beach) proposed a bill to limit damages that nursing home residents could obtain suing their nursing home. Gaetz served as the chairman of a health subcommittee that year. In 2012 and 2013, Rep. Gaetz reported an additional $10,000 to his income from a group called "Caregivers, Inc.," a Pensacola-based assisted-living firm. His relationship to Caregivers, Inc. underscores how legislators can directly benefit from their legislative actions. Another example: State Rep. Andy Gardiner (R-Orlando) saw his income from the Apopka County Chamber of Commerce double while in the House (Auslen 2015). During his eight-year tenure, he proposed five bills explicitly to benefit the city of Orlando, and another three bills that defined what organizations could define themselves as a "Chamber of Commerce."

Various types of prestigious positions may result in access to private-sector benefactors, or passage of favorable policy. Chamber leaders enjoy unparalleled agenda power and are well-situated to use their office for personal gain. Benefactors looking to obtain competent public servants on their payrolls see leadership posts as a heuristic for value. Party leadership positions may allow leaders to steer legislation toward sectors of the economy in which they have private-sector interests, providing opportunities for increased income. Lawmakers assigned to certain committees may benefit from their privileged position in the lawmaking process to shape policy that most benefits themselves. Information obtained in committee sessions provides legislators with economic advantages. Committees

facilitate information-gathering necessary for passing policy (Krehbiel 1991), and committee members have a higher probability of diverting funds to their districts (Berry, Burden, & Howell 2010), particularly those on committees with taxatation and appropriation powers. Membership on prestigious committees is essential if legislators are to use their office for financial gain, because the bulk of the bill drafting process occurs in committee (Krehbiel 1991). Committee chairs in particular should gain due to their roles as gatekeepers (Cox & McCubbins 2005; Owens 1997; Shepsle & Weingast 1987). Majority-party lawmakers may use pork-barrel politics as a means to accumulate wealth. Majority-party control of pork-barrel spending (Berry, Burden, & Howell 2010; Lazarus 2009; Balla et al. 2002) improves economic conditions in the district, indirectly improving the lawmaker's own financial condition.

Access to agenda-setting power makes lawmakers marketable to private-sector, high-paying benefactors. Lawmakers may also benefit from access to agenda control that results in economic growth proximate to their financial interests. I propose the *Access Hypothesis*:

A legislator will receive more financial gain as her access to agenda-setting power increases.

Modeling Financial Gain in the Florida Legislature

Florida is the only legislature in the United States that provides precise dollar amounts on any and all reported outside sources of income.[11] This data availability is due to Florida's Sunshine Law, officially enacted in 1967 to provide public information on all governmental meetings and records. Thanks to these unique data, I am able to analyze the determinants of annual changes in sitting legislators' incomes.

The Florida legislature is a moderately-professionalized state legislature (Squire 2007). It meets 60 days a year, has on average 12 staffers per legislator, and pays its legislators a salary of $29,687.[12] Floridian lawmakers are bound by consecutive term limits, which might induce more income acquisition among some farsighted incumbents. Yet public availability of information and media oversight of legislators' disclosure ought to constrain egregious income acquisition (see Auslen 2015). Average annual real income growth from

1995 to 2014 is a modest $403 and median annual real income growth is actually -$654, indicating that there is no pattern of mass financial gain. While these results may not apply to Congress, Florida is typical for many state legislatures, especially part-time or "citizen" legislatures.

The Speaker of the House, the majority party, and committee chairs exercise control over the chamber agenda similar to Congress and many subnational legislatures. The Speaker assigns bills to committees, while committee chairs wield gatekeeping powers within their jurisdiction. The Appropriations committee and Tax & Finance committees oversee the tax-and-spend powers of the state. The Rules committee in Florida, as in most states, is institutionally weak; its main gatekeeping power is to review proposed amendments to the chamber rules. The majority party dominates the legislative process in the state, allowing virtually no minority-sponsored bills to pass. Officeholders in these posts will realize any financial benefits conferred by holding influence in the legislature.

I leverage a unique dataset of members of the 120-seat Florida House of Representatives from 1995 through 2014. The unit of analysis is the legislator-year; there are 532 unique legislators for a total of 2,905 observations. Florida legislators are required to submit detailed financial data beginning the year that they run for office that contain the source and dollar value of all assets, liabilities, and incomes for each legislator as of December 31st of the year.[13] I operationalize financial gain as an annual change in total income for a given legislator.[14] Table 1 reports the means, media, and standard deviations for annual incomes for legislators from 2001 to 2014. All values of income are recoded into 2001 dollars to account for inflation, increased by $15,771 to eliminate nonpositive integers, and logged.[15] The effects of the Great Recession are apparent; many lawmakers drew incomes from real-estate, finance, and supporting industries.

[Table 1 about here.]

I operationalize electoral safety as **Vote Share** in the most recent election. Vote share measures the share of votes the legislator won in her most recent election, and ranges from 0.44 to 1.00.[16] Vote share is the standard electoral indicator used in studies of incumbents (Lee 2008; Levitt & Wolfram 1997; Jacobsen 1987). The higher a legislator's vote share in the previous election, the less vulnerable they are to an electoral challenge. I anticipate a linear relationship between vote share and (logged) income.

To operationalize access, I use dichotomous measures of **Leadership** positions, **Majority Party** affiliation, and committee membership. Leadership positions indicate whether the legislator was Speaker of the House, Majority Leader, or Minority Leader. Party affiliation indicates membership in the majority party. Democrats were the majority party from 1995-1996, while the Republicans have held the majority since. I measure committee control over the agenda with dichotomous variables that indicate whether a legislator served on the **Appropriations** or **Finance & Tax** committees in a given year.[17] I also include the **Rules** committee, due to its role as a springboard for future party leaders; the committee also votes on amendments to the chamber's rules.[18] Approximately 24% of the legislators sat on the Appropriations Committee at least one year, approximately 17% sat on the Finance & Tax committee for at least one year, and approximately 18% of the legislators sat on the Rules Committee for at least one year. I operationalize **Committee Chairs** with a single measure indicating whether a legislator served as chair for any of the three committees in a given year.

Control Variables

The pursuit of another political office may deter legislators from financial gain. Legislators who look ahead to their next office act differently from those who are not (Carey et al. 2006). Ambitious legislators are not as interested in financial gain, but in building electoral coalitions and securing donors. Ambitious legislators look ahead to the next campaign. The type of office sought matters: legislators who pursue higher office will be less interested in obtaining income than those seeking lower office, who in turn will be less interested in obtaining income than those who return to the private sector. I include two proxy measures of progressive ambition that indicate whether a legislator eventually ran for a higher office, a lower office, or returned to the private sector.[19] 75.7% of the legislators in the data ran for another public office after leaving the House. These control variables are labeled **Ran For Higher Office** and **Ran For Lower Office**, respectively.

I include covariates that measure assignment to standing committees in the Florida House of Representatives overseeing **Agriculture**, **Education**, **Health**, and the state

Judiciary. These four committees are the only policy-specific committees that are clearly identifiable in all twenty legislative sessions in the data. Legislators assigned to "policy-centric" standing committees may have personal financial interests that dovetail with their constituents' legislative needs. These legislators may profit from passing bills that also benefit their constituents, although not to the same extent as sitting on a "power" committee. As such, membership on each "policy-centric" committee should be positively correlated with legislators' income growth.

Legislators with advanced educational achievement, or who select into high-income industries or occupations, will accumulate more income before entering office and may be primed to do so in office. I include a dichotomous measure indicating whether the legislator held a postgraduate degree, labeled **Post-Graduate Degree**. I include a dichotomous measure indicating if the legislator was an attorney, labeled **Legal Career**[20]. Finally, I include a dichotomous measure indicating if the legislator was in business or management occupations as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, labeled **Business Career**. Legislators from legal and business careers ought to be more primed to accumulate additional income than legislators from other occupations.

To control for structural economic inequalities toward underprivileged groups, I include two dichotomous variables for female (labeled **Female**) and non-white legislators (labeled **Non-White**). I expect female and non-white legislators to report lower average annual income increases (Maddox 2004). Since income is positively correlated with age, I include a variable measuring the **Age** of legislators. I include a measure of a legislator's tenure in the Florida House, labeled **Tenure**, to correct for any additional income opportunities afforded to more-experienced lawmakers.[21] Finally, I include a measure of the annual domestic state product for Florida, transformed into 2001 dollars, accounting for economic performance unrelated to inflation. Summary statistics for all explanatory and control variables are reported in Table 2.

[Table 2 about here.]

Model Estimation

I employ three estimation approaches in this paper. These three estimation techniques show consistent support for the Electoral Safety Hypothesis, but little systematic evidence for the Access Hypothesis. First, I use ordinary-least squares regression to report estimated relationships between my independent variables and their levels of income. I also include models that account for both year and legislator fixed-effects to control for common shocks, and employ clustered standard errors due to concerns over serial correlation (see Angrist & Pischke 2009, p. 319).

Treating non-stationary data as stationary results in biased estimation of standard errors (DeBoef & Keele 2008; Drukker 2003; Sims 1972).[22] To overcome both serial correlation and the possibility of cointegration, I use an error-correction model (ECM); its main advantage is to provide short-term and long-term coefficients of time-invariant variables of interest.[23] Examining both effects is advantageous: the benefits of assignment to a committee, or a leadership post, may have short-run costs but long-run rewards.[24]

My ECM analyses employ the Bewley Transformation two-step estimation method (Bewley 1979), which involves estimating an equation, obtaining fitted values $\hat{Y}_t$ and then including them in a second equation, such that:

$$(1)\ \Delta\hat{Y}_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Y_{t-1} + \beta\mathbf{X}_{t-1} + \gamma\Delta\mathbf{X}_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

$$(2)\ \bar{Y}_t = \phi_0 + \phi_1\hat{Y}_t + \beta\mathbf{X}_t + \gamma\Delta\mathbf{X}_t + \epsilon_t$$

Where $\bar{Y}_t$ is the outcome variable and $\mathbf{X}$ represents the matrix of covariates. The major advantages of the Bewley Transformation ECM are precise estimates and standard errors, as well as providing directly interpretable results (see DeBoef & Keele 2008, p. 192). A change in one independent variable represents a disturbance in the equilibrium between two time series (DeBoef & Keele 2008, p. 192).[25]

Third, I use differences-in-differences matching to generate matched datasets with multiple treatments: leadership posts, committee chairs, committee assignment, or vote share. Doing so addresses concerns over both serial correlation, and nonrandom assignment to committees or leadership posts by finding legislators who are similar to each other in all ways except some were "treated" and others are "control." Using a differences-

in-differences matching approach (Kern 2010), the goal is to match legislators who are treated in a given year to legislators not treated. The dependent variable for all matched data is $\Delta Income = Income_t - Income_{t-1}$. The comparison is between income growth for the treatment group, and income growth for the control group.

For committee, committee chair, and leadership posts, differenced variables take on trichotomous outcomes: assignment, no change, and removal. I compare observations where $Variable_t - Variable_{t-1} = 1$ is true to observations where $Variable_t - Variable_{t-1} = 0$ is true, eliminating those observations where legislators are removed from committees.[26] I create five matched datasets, one for each treatment; one for each committee (Rules, Appropriations, Finance & Tax), one for party leadership posts, and one for chairs of those committees.[27] For vote share, I generate three dichotomous "treatment" variables that measure changes over a legislator's last two elections, such that if a legislator's vote share remains constant or increases from $Election_{t-1}$ to $Election_t$, they are coded as a 1.[28] Since greater increases in vote share ought to lead to greater increases in income, I also match legislators whose vote share increased by at least 5% and 10%, respectively, to legislators whose vote shares increased by smaller amounts. In sum, I create eight matched datasets, one for each "treatment."

The pool of covariates used for estimating propensity scores consists of all available independent and control variables reported earlier (save the model-specific treatment variable), resulting in 17 covariates to balance treatment and control groups. Additionally, I include a covariate for year to improve the odds that two observations in the same year will be matched. For all time-transitive covariates, I rely on the lagged $covariate_{t-1}$ form of the variable to ensure temporal precedence. I restrict matches only to units within 0.5 standard deviations for committee and vote share models to remove outliers, but report the full model for leadership and chair posts due to the small number of plausible counterfactuals.[29] I report balance statistics for each 0.5-caliper matched dataset in the Appendix.

Results

Table 3 reports the results of six OLS models. For ease of reporting, I do not report coefficients for control variables; they are in the Appendix. In columns (1) and (2), I report the full model, while models (3) and (4) report a model that excludes Access Hypothesis variables and models (5) and (6) exclude vote share. Models (2), (4), and (6) include year and legislator fixed-effects; doing so accounts for economic shocks in Florida that affected all or some legislators in the sample. Because the dependent variable is logged, coefficients must be exponentiated to determine the actual value of the income increase or decrease. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

[Table 3 about here.]

The results show support for the Electoral Safety Hypothesis. Legislators whose vote share increases by 10 percentage points see their incomes rise by up to 2.8%, as reported in the Electoral Safety-only model. For the average legislator making $125,873 per year, such a modest electoral boost translates into an increase of $3,600. Even for a legislator making the median income of $85,439, she could earn as much as $3,450/year. Such mild income effects become more potent when we consider the all-too common scenario where a hypothetical lawmaker making $125,873 wins her first election with 60% of the vote and runs unopposed in her second election. Here, she would pocket as much as $14,400.

By contrast, having access to agenda control does not boost income. Assignment to a leadership post is associated with an increase of 40%; for a lawmaker with average income of $125,873, becoming a leader raises income by $52,000. These estimated effects disappear when including legislator-fixed effects, ostensibly due to the small number of leaders in the dataset. So too with legislators assigned to committee chairs; they report income increases of 26%, or $32,200 for legislators making average income, but these effects disappear when including legislator fixed-effects. Legislators assigned to the Rules Committee report *declining* income of approximately 8%, or $10,400 for a lawmaker making average income. Membership in the majority party, or membership on the two tax-and-spend committees, has no statistically-significant or substantive influence

on legislators' personal incomes.

These results indicate that the market values only the most powerful agenda-setters (and even that finding is contingent on model specification), but the market values broad swaths of incumbents who demonstrate electoral viability. Indeed, membership on prestigious committees can even harm legislators' personal finances. Private-sector benefactors, existing employers, and other market forces may see electoral viability as a long-term investment, while lawmakers, freed from the time costs involved with campaigning, may pursue additional income. Conversely, those lawmakers in competitive races may eschew income, resulting in relative impoverishment.

Error-Correction Models

In Table 4, I report the results of three error-correction models.[30] The first model reports coefficients that test both hypotheses. The second model reports only coefficients that test the Electoral Safety Hypothesis, while the third model reports coefficients that test the Access Hypothesis. Short-run effects are indicated with a Δ prefix alongside the variable, while long-run effects are indicated with a $_{t-1}$ suffix. Interpreting a coefficient's substantive impact involves exponentiating the coefficient. For example, the short-run effect of increasing a legislator's vote share is 5.7% in the full model and 6.3% in the Electoral Safety-only model, which for a legislator making average income of $125,783 translates into increases of $7,175 and $7,930, respectively.

[Table 4 about here.]

Increasing vote share by 10 percentage points over the previous election increases legislative income by approximately $7,500 in the short run in the full model and $7,900 in the Electoral Safety-only model. There is no long-run boost to income as vote share rises, suggesting that market value adjusts quickly to legislators' electoral fortunes. The short-run effect of vote share on income becomes even more potent if we consider an all-too-common occurrence in state electoral politics. A second-term lawmaker who initially won the seat with a robust 60% of the vote runs unopposed in her re-election bid. An

increase in vote share of 40% increases her income by 24.7%, or $31,090, in a single year. This indicates strong support for the Electoral Safety hypothesis.

By contrast, my analysis suggests mixed support for the Access Hypothesis. Legislators who become party leaders see a boost to their incomes in the long run of approximately 40%, accruing $51,148 for a legislator making average income. This is unsurprising given the high value that the public and media place on leaders. Conversely, legislators in the majority party report declines to their income in the short run; the decline in income is 27%, or $33,459.[31] Finally, the only committee coefficient that reports a statistically-significant effect is the Rules Committee. Legislators on the Rules Committee report a change in their income of $-21,677 in their first year of service on the committee. These results are broadly consistent with the OLS models reported in Table 3: lawmakers in safer seats report positive changes to their income, but on average, lawmakers with access to agenda-setting powers do not report any gains in income. Members of the chamber leadership report gains, but most members of the majority party, and those assigned to the prestigious Rules Committee, report income losses.

Differences-in-Differences Matching

In Table 5, I report the results of differences-in-differences matching for three committees: Rules, Finance & Tax, and Appropriations. Estimates report average differenced income received by legislators appointed to a given committee compared to average differenced income received by legislators not appointed to that given committee, such that $Y = \Delta Income_t - \Delta Income_c$. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. I use 1:1 matching, therefore each matched dataset consists of half treated and half control units.

[Table 5 about here.]

These findings show consistent support for the Electoral Safety Hypothesis. Legislators whose vote share rises by any margin, or margins of at least 5% or 10%, report increases in their incomes of between $13,800 and $20,800. Legislators who demonstrate not only electoral viability, but electoral improvement, are handsomely rewarded.

By contrast, these findings are consistent with prior models, suggesting that agenda control has little relationship with private-sector income growth. With one exception, there are no statistically-significant relationships between committee or leadership posts and income. Assignment to the Rules Committee reduces a legislator's income by approximately $85,000 while assignment to the other committees has no effect on income. The evidence presented by the matched data indicates that obtaining a spot on a prestigious committee does not provide immediate financial benefits, and for some committees are even detrimental to legislators' income. The decline of nearly $85,000 for legislators assigned to the Rules Committee is nearly two-thirds of the annual income for the average legislator. Lower-income lawmakers surely cannot afford such a costly position, leaving much agenda-setting power in the hands of the wealthiest lawmakers.

The strong evidence for the Electoral Safety hypothesis suggests that legislators' ability to acquire income is linked to their electoral fortunes; the market value of electorally-vulnerable legislators is lower than that of lawmakers in safe seats. Legislative party leaders do obtain additional income, but since leaders obtain these positions in their last term in office, most of the financial gains from becoming a leader are likely to accrue after they leave office. Status in the majority party is negatively associated with income growth, although those effects are wholly constrained to Republicans entering office in the 1997-1998 and 1998-1999 legislative terms. It is unclear whether the effect is due to lower-income Republicans replacing higher-income Democrats, or the additional time constraints and resource burdens shouldered on the majority party. Finally, assignment to the Rules Committee results in reduced income.

Rules Committee Assignment

That there is a consistent negative relationship between the Rules Committee and income, but not the other two committees and income, begs for an alternative explanation. I analyze two potential alternatives. One of the Rules Committee's responsibilities involves handling legislative ethics concerns; indeed, from 2000 to 2002, the Rules Committee was officially the "Rules, Ethics, & Elections" Committee and from 2002 to 2004,

both the Rules and Ethics Committees were subcommittees of the larger Procedures Council. Perhaps, primed with more-detailed knowledge of ethics violations, these legislators are hesitant to pursue additional income. With the assistance of the Clerk of the Florida House of Representatives, I obtained data on all members of all standing, select, and joint Ethics Committees in the chamber, 1995-2014. These data listed the meeting times, the transgressions the committees investigated, and the alleged violator. From these data I coded whether or not a legislator sat on an ethics panel in each legislative session and re-estimated coefficients from OLS models (1) and (2) reported in Table 3. Doing so did not negate the inverse relationship between Rules Committee assignment and income, nor did it ameliorate the magnitude of the effect.

Perhaps Rules committee members accept short-term income losses knowing their post-electoral careers will be lucrative. I collected data on all corporate boards each legislator sat on while in the legislature or after they left the legislature. There are two caveats with these corporate board data: I do not know board members' income, and the dataset yielded only 35 unique legislators who sat on boards large enough to be in the data. Those data show that membership to the Rules Committee is not associated with sitting on more corporate boards or even any corporate boards. If legislators anticipate delayed gratification, they do not receive it. It may be that assignment to the Finance & Tax or Appropriations Committees has a similar time constraint as the Rules Committee, adversely affecting incomes, but these lawmakers can use their tax-and-spend powers to directly benefit themselves with public dollars, offsetting decreased income. Members of the Rules Committee lack that explicit benefit. Indeed, Florida Rules Committee's most important role is a stepping stone for future leaders, rather than having any proactive ability to pass spending bills or adjust tax rates.

Discussion

I contribute to the emerging literature on legislative financial gains, hypothesizing that electorally-safe legislators and lawmakers with access to agenda-setting power are valued

more than their colleagues, and testing that theory with a novel dataset of legislative income. The data find support for the Electoral Safety hypothesis, but inconsistent support for the Access Hypothesis. These results stand in contrast to findings that show lawmakers benefit from holding office, and in contradiction to citizen perceptions of public office as a vehicle for becoming wealthy. Furthermore, the types of legislators that my theory predicts will acquire income show little evidence of financial gain. Aside from lawmakers in safe seats, and party leaders,

Florida has a unique mix of institutional incentives that should incentivize lawmakers to acquire outside income. Moreover, the novel Florida financial disclosure data ought to pick up even miniscule amounts of income. I find strong evidence for the conditionality of financial gains - only in select circumstances do legislators get wealthy while in office. I find evidence that only safe lawmakers, and the top party leaders, receive private benefits - indicating the conditionality of financial gains.

Citizens should be pleasantly surprised to discover that legislators across the board do not achieve financial returns to office. Party leaders and committee chairs should be able to parley their influence into wealth, but either choose not to or are prevented from doing so. Efforts to increase the competitiveness of legislative districts may be in the interests of reformers who wish to reduce the role of money in politics. Making districts competitive would prevent many legislators from using their office for financial gain. At the same time, making districts more competitive may only induce those wealthy enough to sacrifice substantial sums of income to run, and decrease representative congruence between most Americans and their political leaders.

Consistent support for the Electoral Safety hypothesis might explain much seemingly-selfish legislative behavior even in the midst of populist, anti-incumbent public sentiment. As citizens clamor for higher turnover, legislators increasingly secure themselves within safer seats and work to deter quality opponents from running. The benefits of public financing of campaigns on electoral competitiveness are obvious (Malhotra 2008). Legislators who obtain access to agenda-setting powers might have to "dirty their hands" in the business of governing, leaving less time available to earn money. Wealthier lawmakers

may sacrifice some potential income to engage in politics and change policy. Whatever benefits they obtain from public office occur after they leave office, or not at all.

I believe this research opens up several avenues for future research. Does the pursuit of income result in legislative shirking? Most importantly, the value of office ought to reshape our understanding of existing legislative hierarchies. Legislative effectiveness and legislative complexity may be lower among legislators who earn income at higher rates than their colleagues; ostensibly, pursuing additional income requires investments of time and resources which could be allocated on governing. If lawmakers choose to pursue financial gain, they may do so at the cost of passing policy. Additionally, legislators who pursue additional income may also receive additional campaign contributions from interest groups. Conversely, legislators who report high income growth might not have the time to solicit contributions, or may be able to self-finance their own campaigns and eschew donations from interest groups. Legislators might be more likely to propose legislation in the same industry where they work, and those bills might be positively correlated with their bottom line.

Notes

[1]Far more egregious anecdotal evidence of the use of public office to financially self-enrich abounds. In the 1990s and 2000s, Congressional Speaker Dennis Hastert made millions of dollars purchasing land in central Illinois and then appropriating federal dollars to construct a highway through said lands (Gold & Narayanswamy 2015). In 2009, Ways and Means Committee member William Jefferson was sentenced to 13 years in prison for using his office to launder nearly $400,000 in bribes (Markon 2009). Potential abuse occurs at the local level as well. In 2008, newly-elected Speaker of the Florida House Ray Sansom was appointed the Vice President for Development and Planning at North Florida State College. He was later found to have appropriated $41 million to the college, including $6 million to build an airplane hangar for a wealthy donor (Leary, Bousquet, & Caputo 2009) and was indicted on official misconduct charges. All three individuals held positions of official prominence in their respective legislatures and faced few electoral challenges.

[2]Diermeier, Keane, & Merlo also estimate that winning re-election for the first time increases post-congressional wages by 4.4 percent for the U.S. House and 16.7 percent in the U.S. Senate.

[3]Other literature focuses on the opportunity cost to politicians wherein they weigh the benefits of office as opposed to their private-sector incomes. See Caselli & Morelli 2004; Maddox 2004; Groseclose & Krehbiel 1994. Also see Besley & Coates 1997 and Osborne & Slivinski 1996 for more on citizen-candidate models. These literatures are more interested in how financial gain influences the selection of candidates rather than how holding office incentivizes financial gain.

[4]Lundqvist (2013) finds no evidence of financial gain among Swedish municipal councillors. The author notes that Sweden's electoral rules do not incentivize candidates to develop name brands and cultivate constituencies loyal to them and not the party. See Carey & Shugart (1995) for more on how electoral rules manipulate candidate incentives. Lenz & Lim (2009) compare matched samples of members of Congress and private citizens, and find no evidence that members of Congress accumulate wealth more quickly

than the public. Eggers & Hainmueller (2013) find no evidence of sitting lawmakers enriching themselves through the stock market.

[5]Consistent with extant literature, I assume that legislators, like most people, want to make more money. See Cagetti 2003; Browning & Lusardi 1996; Caballero 1991 for a discussion of the incentives for people to accumulate wealth, including to hedge against recessions and uncertainty over one's current job.

[6]I assume that legislators prioritize re-election and passing policy over wealth accumulation, consistent with Mayhew and Fenno's prioritization of these goals. I do not assume that legislators prioritize re-election over passing policy. The proliferation of institutional and self-imposed term limits, the growing incumbency advantage, and literature on the effects of selective candidate retirement (Groseclose & Krehbiel 1994; Herrick, Moore, & Hibbing 1994), indicate that many legislators do not pursue re-election over the passage of good policy.

[7]Fundraising is a serious time sink for candidates. Francia & Herrnson (2003) estimate that legislators who are given matching public campaign funds spend as much as 30% less on fundraising time, freeing their schedules for other activities. The Washington Post reported in 2013 that Democratic Members of Congress spend four hours a day soliciting donors (Klein 2013).

[8]Parker (1992) found that legislators received larger honoraria for cooperating with outside groups on legislation.

[9]Private-sector benefactors do not expect lawmakers to provide *quid pro quos*, but there may be an implicit assumption that the lawmaker will provide their new employer with expertise unavailable to other persons in the political process. Employers may even see offering employment to sitting legislators as a gateway to a post-office lobbying or consulting position.

[10]Also see Szakonyi (2016) for a discussion on the corporate profits of business leaders who hold public office.

[11]No other legislature (even Congress) requires legislators to disclose this information in dollar amounts. This is thanks to Florida's "Sunshine Law," which imposes transparency

requirements and obligations on elected officials in the state. Some states require legislators to disclose their income in broad dollar ranges, while many other states require listing the name of employers and provide a nominal, value-less list of assets. Some states require little to no disclosure information at all. See the Appendix for a description of the financial disclosures available for each state legislature, and for Congress.

[12]The average pay for salaried state legislators in the 41 states that pay annual salaries is $34,812, as reported by the National Conference of State Legislators.

[13]Members of the Florida House of Representatives are elected to two-year terms; most legislators serve at least two terms. As a result, most legislators are represented by least four observations in the dataset. These data were provided by the Florida Commission on Ethics. Due to sporadic turnover by death, early retirement, progressive ambition, and involuntary resignation, some years have more than 120 members and subsequently more than 120 financial disclosure forms. Some legislators fill out amended disclosure forms, Form 6X. When there is a discrepancy between Form 6 and Form 6X, I use the most recent information provided. See the Appendix for a more thorough discussion of the data-collection process.

[14]For other measures of legislator income, see the Appendix; specifically, the section on Additional Jobs and Salary/Wage Income.

[15]As is common with econometric analyses that involve financial dependent variables (Manning & Mullahy 2001; Manning 1998), a logged dependent variable satisfies the linearity assumption of linear regression models. With a logged dependent variable, the coefficient for an independent variable is interpreted as the average percentage change in the dependent variable associated with a one-unit change in the independent variable. An alternative to an intercept-shifted, logged dependent variable is to use the hyperbolic inverse sine transformation (Burbidge, Magee, & Robb 1988). I report the results of OLS and ECM models with the hyperbolic inverse sine transformation in the Appendix.

[16]Vote share for each legislator was gathered from the Klarner et al. (2011) dataset, a comprehensive list of all state legislative electoral outcomes from 1967-2010.

[17]The official names of the committees reported by the Florida House of Representatives

website change over time, but their basic policy functions do not.

[18]Members of the Florida House of Representative Rules Committee often find themselves in leadership posts later in their careers. Of the 28 unique legislators to have served as Minority Party Leader, Majority Party Leader, or Speaker of the House, 24 were appointed to the Rules Committee earlier in their tenure (or served contemporaneously).

[19]Higher offices include state senate, statewide office (including judicial offices such as circuit courts) or the U.S. Congress. Lower office consists of mayoralships, city or county commissions, or local judicial offices. To obtain these measures, I conducted Internet searches for reports that former House members announced a run for office. Indicators included press releases, campaign websites, and election outcomes. My searches included, but were not limited to, the Florida House of Representatives website, Project VoteSmart's online database of state legislators, and Ballotpedia. When two sources provided contradictory evidence, the Florida House website took precedent over Project VoteSmart, which in turn took precedent over Ballotpedia, which took precedent over all other sources.

[20]Thirty-three, or 7%, of the lawyers in the dataset never obtained any postgraduate degree.

[21]Another measure controls for Florida's term-limits law by coding 1 if the lawmaker is in her last term and 0 otherwise. Perhaps lawmakers may accumulate additional income in their final term once removed from electoral constraints. However, controlling for a lawmaker's last term does not substantively influence other coefficients. Moreover, the coefficient for a "Last Term" Variable is negative, indicating that in a legislator's last term, their income declines.

[22]An augmented Dickey-Fuller test for cointegration reveals that the full data reject the null hypothesis that at least one time series is not cointegrated. However, the same test for subsamples of the data cannot reject the null.

[23]Another advantage of the ECM is to address non-stationarity without needing to abandon time-invariant independent variables that predict the dependent variable. For more discussion on the proper uses of the error-correction model and the tradeoffs between

it and other techniques, see Grant & Lebo (2016) or Keele, Linn, & Webb (2016).

[24]Estimation of the ECM proceeds as follows. A long-term effect is estimated by including a lagged form of the independent variable. A short-term effect is estimated by including a differenced form of the independent variable. The model calculates the long-term estimates for all time-invariant independent variables and both the long-term and short-term effects for all time-variant independent variables. The short-term effect of time-invariant IVs will be zero. See DeBoef & Keele (2008) for a detailed treatment on estimation procedures for error-correction models.

[25]The error-correction rate, α_1, represents the time it takes to reach the new equilibrium level of income. Since the α_1 in my model is greater than one, all long-term effects are fully realized in the subsequent year. I report bootstrapped standard errors clustered by legislator (see Freedman 1984).

[26]For committees, chairs, and leadership posts, such a comparison is uninteresting since a nonrandom subset of *removed* legislators leave their posts coterminously with their retirement, and the effect of removal from that committee cannot be distinguished with removal from the chamber. These data permit only measurement of lawmakers who leave a committee before they leave office. Moreover, this measurement too is flawed as junior lawmakers in Florida are often assigned to particular committees for only one year instead of a full legislative term in order to provide more lawmakers with access to particular committees - this rule is at the discretion of individual Speakers of the House. Therefore, all observations where $Variable_t - Variable_{t-1} = -1$ are dropped from the dataset to focus just on the effect of assignment to committees. Only a small number of observations are removed in this way; see the Appendix for more details.

[27]There are benefits of a differences-in-differences matching approach for these data. First, this type of matching necessitates that members of the control group have not been previously assigned to treatment. In Florida, members of the House are rarely assigned to a committee for more than one year or one term. It is almost unheard-of that legislators are assigned to a committee, re-assigned to another committee, and then allowed to serve on the original committee during their eight-year tenure. Second, assignment to a

committee, chair, or leadership post has a treatment temporally precedes the outcome: a legislator assigned to a post for 2006 will receive their assignment duties in November or December of 2005, will serve on the post for two months in Spring 2006, and will report their financial disclosure as of December 31, 2006.

[28]Coding a legislator with unchanged vote share allows legislators who run unopposed in subsequent elections to still count as treated units. I remove legislators who run unopposed from the sample and the results are robust to that change in specification.

[29]Using calipers with large data can eliminate poor matches, but there are concerns doing so may over-report the true effect of the treatment. I ran analysis for twenty caliper lengths, spaced out from 0.1 standard deviations to 2.0 standard deviations. The results are statistically-significant across all caliper lengths for the electoral safety and committee models (90% confidence intervals, one-tailed tests). Balance is maximized with a smaller caliper - 0.5 standard deviations optimizes balance without restrictively small sample sizes.

[30]All control variables were omitted from Table 4 for clarity of presentation and are reported in full in the Appendix.

[31]Since 1997, the Republicans have held the majority in the Florida House of Representatives. The short-term changes indicate this switch from Democratic to Republican control, including several individuals who switched parties from the Democrats to the Republicans in 1998 and 1999. The short-run effect here largely picks up the effect of wealthier Democrats being replaced by less-wealthy Republicans.

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Table 1: Means, Medians, and Standard Deviations of Income (in 2001 $USD) for Members of the Florida House of Representatives, 1995-2014

	Mean	Median	Std.Deviation
1995	$103,666	$74,854	$105,330
1996	$105.535	$78,609	$98,915
1997	$101,501	$86,334	$78,357
1998	$109,252	$93,393	$76,704
1999	$141,196	$101,108	$259,749
2000	$115,697	$85,444	$104,622
2001	$119,528	$78,666	$126,493
2002	$121,595	$86,485	$136,134
2003	$127,861	$86,112	$197,277
2004	$131,660	$87,839	$173,172
2005	$139,141	$97,227	$212,739
2006	$171,599	$99,165	$284,692
2007	$137,422	$93,011	$150,164
2008	$115,824	$85,079	$99,125
2009	$107,392	$82,643	$76,552
2010	$106,484	$79,891	$92,213
2011	$116,399	$82,646	$118,568
2012	$184,915	$84,379	$599,959
2013	$125,306	$80,532	$138,082
2014	$117,444	$74,583	$141,741
Average	$125,873	$85,440	$203,957

Table 2: Summary Statistics: Explanatory and Control Variables for Members of the Florida House of Representatives, 1995-2014

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum
Vote Share	0.448	0	1
Leadership	0.021	0	1
Majority Party	0.620	0	1
Rules Committee	0.194	0	1
Finance & Tax Committee	0.183	0	1
Appropriations Committee	0.231	0	1
Committee Chairs	0.0213	0	1
Agriculture Committee	0.080	0	1
Education Committee	0.099	0	1
Health Committee	0.103	0	1
Judiciary Committee	0.097	0	1
Announced, Higher Office	0.427	0	1
Announced, Lower Office	0.210	0	1
Age	48	23	79
Tenure	5.28	0	38
Post-Graduate Degree	0.506	0	1
Legal Career	0.272	0	1
Business/Management Career	0.309	0	1
Female	0.235	0	1
White	0.713	0	1
GSP	$643,868	$541,898	$796,051

Table 3: OLS Model, Predictors of Legislative Income Gains, Florida House of Representatives 1995-2014

	Dependent variable:					
	Income (2001 $USD)					
	Full Model		Electoral Safety		Access	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Vote Share	0.242***	0.163**	0.281***	0.163**		
	(0.088)	(0.068)	(0.088)	(0.068)		
Party Leaders	0.396***	−0.046			0.413***	−0.037
	(0.099)	(0.070)			(0.099)	(0.070)
Majority Party	0.069*	0.003			0.065*	0.004
	(0.036)	(0.037)			(0.036)	(0.037)
Committee Chairs	0.256**	0.027			0.263***	0.027
	(0.099)	(0.064)			(0.100)	(0.064)
Rules Committee	−0.030	−0.048*			−0.024	−0.050*
	(0.044)	(0.028)			(0.044)	(0.028)
Finance & Tax Committee	−0.047	−0.027			−0.053	−0.028
	(0.044)	(0.029)			(0.044)	(0.029)
Appropriations Committee	0.042	−0.012			0.049	−0.008
	(0.038)	(0.025)			(0.038)	(0.025)
Agriculture Committee	−0.041	−0.022	−0.045	−0.004	−0.040	−0.017
	(0.068)	(0.045)	(0.068)	(0.045)	(0.068)	(0.045)
Education Committee	0.053	−0.057	0.030	−0.055	0.049	−0.060
	(0.060)	(0.038)	(0.060)	(0.038)	(0.060)	(0.038)
Health Committee	0.057	−0.006	0.040	−0.002	0.065	−0.005
	(0.057)	(0.037)	(0.057)	(0.037)	(0.057)	(0.037)
Judiciary Committee	0.135**	0.018	0.121**	0.022	0.130**	0.016
	(0.060)	(0.039)	(0.060)	(0.039)	(0.060)	(0.039)
Ran For Higher Office	0.117***		0.123***		0.120***	
	(0.039)		(0.039)		(0.039)	
Ran For Lower Office	−0.075		−0.077		−0.080*	
	(0.046)		(0.047)		(0.046)	
Age	0.012***		0.011***		0.012***	
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Tenure	−0.021***		−0.017***		−0.021***	
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Post-Graduate Degree	0.218***		0.217***		0.220***	
	(0.039)		(0.039)		(0.039)	
Legal Career	0.137***		0.126***		0.149***	
	(0.049)		(0.049)		(0.049)	
Business Career	0.145***		0.137***		0.154***	
	(0.040)		(0.040)		(0.040)	
Female	−0.342***		−0.354***		−0.355***	
	(0.041)		(0.041)		(0.041)	
White	0.190***		0.220***		0.166***	
	(0.040)		(0.040)		(0.040)	
GDP (2001 $USD)	0.00000**		0.00000**		0.00000***	
	(0.00000)		(0.00000)		(0.00000)	
Fixed Effects	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Intercept	10.160***	11.229***	10.261***	11.193***	10.313***	11.317***
	(0.192)	(0.391)	(0.189)	(0.390)	(0.184)	(0.390)
Observations	1,580	2,278	1,582	2,283	1,580	2,278
Adjusted R^2	0.152	0.697	0.138	0.695	0.148	0.696
F Statistic	14.445***	11.858***	17.917***	11.878***	14.723***	11.839***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: Error Correction Model, Predictors of Legislative Income Gains, 1995-2014

	Dependent variable: Income		
	Full Model	Electoral Safety	Access Hypothesis
$\Delta\hat{Y}$	$-1.685 * **$	-1.722***	$-1.685 * **$
	(0.364)	(0.370)	(0.365)
Δ Votemarg	$0.551 * **$	0.610***	
	(0.150)	(0.153)	
Votemarg_{t-1}	0.108	0.169	
	(0.105)	(0.102)	
Δ Leadership	0.131		0.204
	(0.160)		(0.154)
Leadership_{t-1}	$0.341*$		$0.327*$
	(0.160)		(0.159)
Δ Majority Party	$-0.309 * **$		$-0.316 * **$
	(0.053)		(0.051)
$\text{Majority Party}_{t-1}$	0.055		0.060
	(0.050)		(0.050)
Δ Rules Committee	$-0.189 * *$		$-0.193 * *$
	(0.069)		(0.071)
Rules _{t-1}	0.065		0.063
	(0.052)		(0.052)
Δ Finance & Tax Committee	-0.037		-0.040
	(0.054)		(0.052)
$\text{Finance \& Tax Committee}_{t-1}$	-0.105		-0.120
	(0.068)		(0.070)
Δ Appropriations Committee	0.012		0.019
	(0.035)		(0.034)
$\text{Appropriations Committee}_{t-1}$	0.062		0.070
	(0.061)		(0.060)
Intercept	$10.158 * **$	10.319***	$10.213 * **$
	(0.232)	(0.217)	(0.244)
N	1210.000	1212.000	1210.000
Wald χ^2	420.82	360.69	406.55
R^2	0.474	0.467	0.473
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table 5: Differences-in-Differences Matching: Determinants of Personal Income Gains, Florida House of Representatives 1995-2014

Treatment	Estimate	Standard Error	N
ΔVote Share> 0	18,449***	(3,994.4)	660
ΔVote Share> 0.05	20,773***	(6,497)	580
ΔVote Share> 0.10	13,843*	(7,270.7)	500
Leadership	25,306	(42,934)	50
Committee Chair	-4,765.2	(13,034)	56
Rules Committee	-84,820*	(44,573)	178
Finance & Tax Committee	-6,408	(7,544.5)	120
Appropriations Committee	5,255	(6,935.5)	250

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01