I am a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Florida State University. I study political institutions and elite behavior, with specialization in subnational politics. My research has been published at Legislative Studies Quarterly and State Politics & Policy Quarterly.
My primary research interests focus on legislative institutions, exploring in particular the effects of institutions and institutional reforms on the behavior of political elites. My dissertation focuses on the conditions under which sitting lawmakers profit from office. My dissertation finds that electoral constraints, and not institutionally-derived prestige or power, deter income acquisition while in office. Additionally, I show that term limits and staffing cuts did not weaken incumbents, and may have even strengthened them. I further my research agenda to explore cross-institutional constraints on legislative financial gains, as well as explore the consequences of income-oriented legislators. My final dissertation essay analyzes the mechanisms by which term limits and state staffing cuts increased the legislative incumbency effect and is under review.
My investigation of institutional effects on individual legislative behavior are not constrained to subnational government. I have research under review that explores the role of competence and in-group trait evaluations of members of the U.S. Cabinet. Additionally, the financial disclosure requirements of members of Congress provide me an opportunity to measure how financial gains are shaped by ambitious lawmakers as they move through the pipeline of public service.
I am also a senior researcher on the Florida Policy Agendas Project, part of the larger Comparative Agendas Project. We are the second subnational-level project (along with Pennsylvania), and are conducting research on the role of legislative institutions on agenda prioritization. For more information, please visit http://www.comparativeagendas.info.
My primary research interests focus on legislative institutions, exploring in particular the effects of institutions and institutional reforms on the behavior of political elites. My dissertation focuses on the conditions under which sitting lawmakers profit from office. My dissertation finds that electoral constraints, and not institutionally-derived prestige or power, deter income acquisition while in office. Additionally, I show that term limits and staffing cuts did not weaken incumbents, and may have even strengthened them. I further my research agenda to explore cross-institutional constraints on legislative financial gains, as well as explore the consequences of income-oriented legislators. My final dissertation essay analyzes the mechanisms by which term limits and state staffing cuts increased the legislative incumbency effect and is under review.
My investigation of institutional effects on individual legislative behavior are not constrained to subnational government. I have research under review that explores the role of competence and in-group trait evaluations of members of the U.S. Cabinet. Additionally, the financial disclosure requirements of members of Congress provide me an opportunity to measure how financial gains are shaped by ambitious lawmakers as they move through the pipeline of public service.
I am also a senior researcher on the Florida Policy Agendas Project, part of the larger Comparative Agendas Project. We are the second subnational-level project (along with Pennsylvania), and are conducting research on the role of legislative institutions on agenda prioritization. For more information, please visit http://www.comparativeagendas.info.
